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I. INTRODUCTION
The question of actionable "use," or "trademark use,"
has become a central issue in determining the reach of trade-
mark owners' rights on the Internet. Our traditional concep-
tion of trademark infringement entails a defendant applying a
competitor's mark (or a word or symbol that is confusingly
similar to it) to the labels of its own goods, or to displays,
documents or advertisements for its goods or services, which
may mislead consumers about the goods' or services' source.
In such cases, the defendant has engaged in a "trademark use"
of the word or symbol at issue by closely associating it with
goods or services it is offering for sale, so that consumers are
likely to rely on it for information about the product or ser-
vice's source or sponsorship. Prior to the rise of the Internet,
the issue of whether an infringement defendant made a
"trademark use" rarely arose.
However, the Internet has provided a host of new ways
for ingenious businesses and individuals to promote their own
agendas through unauthorized use of others' marks. Ensuing
infringement suits have forced courts to answer questions for
which there is relatively little pre-Internet guidance. Should
direct infringement liability be limited to cases in which a
mark owner can demonstrate that the defendant used its mark
(or a word or symbol that is confusingly similar to it) "as a
trademark" to identify the source of its goods or services? Al-
ternatively, should any unauthorized use of the mark suffice, as
long as the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant's use
affects interstate commerce and may confuse consumers at
some point in time? If there is a "trademark use" limitation to
the direct infringement cause of action, what, exactly, does it
entail?' How much of a causal relationship must there be be-
tween the use and confusion?
These issues have generated a host of splits among the
federal courts, and a growing body of scholarly literature argu-
' The possibilities' range from the strict "affixation or other close association re-
quirement" set forth in pre-Lanham Act common law and the Trademark Act of
1905, to a simple requirement that the use have some relation to commercial activity.
See infra notes 3, 65-70, 106-21. See cases cited in notes 3, 121, infra. Should it suffice
if the defendant's use of the mark interferes with the mark owner's sales or business
good will? Should it suffice that the defendant's use was only remotely or indirectly
connected with commercial activity? For example, what if the use is on a non-
commercial web site that links to commercial sites? What if the defendant's use is
invisible to consumers? See infra note 3.
2 In the early "cyber squatter" cases, a line of decisions found that registering a do-
main name that incorporated the plaintiffs mark constituted actionable use if done
with intent to trade on the mark's value as a mark. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toep-
pen, 141 F.3d 1311, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998); Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp.
[Vol. 28:1
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ing and proposing a range of angles to consider and ap-
proaches to take.3 One issue that has frequently been noted in
the course of this discussion, but never directly addressed, is
the relationship between the plaintiffs burden to demonstrate
the defendant's actionable use, or "trademark use," and the
"fair use" defense to infringement liability. That defense,
1227 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Other courts declined to impose liability in such cases, reason-
ing that the defendant's actions did not constitute actionable trademark use. Ford
Motor Co. v. Great Domains.com, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 635, 647-48 (E.D. Mich.
2002).
In another line of cases, sometimes called "gripe site" or "forum" cases, courts
imposed liability on defendants who registered domain names that incorporated the
plaintiff's mark, and used the domain name to identify a website, even though the
website engaged in no commercial activity, but merely communicated the defen-
dant's criticism of the plaintiff or its products or religious or political views. See, e.g.,
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366-67
(4th Cir. 2001); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629,
1997 WL 133313, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997), affd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1997).
Some courts essentially ignored the question of actionable use. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs.
Sapphire Bay Condos West v. Simpson, 129 Fed. Appx. 711, 714 (3d Cir. 2005); Coca-
Cola Co. v. Purdy, No. 02-1782, 2005 WL 212797, at *4-5 (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 2005).
Others purported to find "trademark use," reasoning that: (1) the defendant linked
to other Internet sites that offered goods or services for sale, see, e.g., Jews for Jesus v.
Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 288-91 (D.N.J. 1998), affd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998);
People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, 263 F.3d at 365; (2) the defendant's use of the
mark "affected" the plaintiffs sales, see, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL 133313 at
*4; E. &J. Gallo Winery v. Spider Webs Ltd., 286 F.3d 270, 275 (5th Cir. 2002); or (3)
the defendant's personal rant constituted the "dissemination of information services"
within the meaning of the Lanham Act, see, e.g., Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL 133313
at *4. Other courts declined to impose liability due to a lack of actionable use. See,
e.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 682 (9th Cir. 2005); Voice-Tel
Ent., Inc. v.JOBA, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1362-63 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
In the "meta tagging" cases, enterprising website operators placed the plain-
tiffs mark in hidden HTML code on their sites, hoping that search engines would
detect the presence of the mark and list the site in the search results of Internet users
entering the mark as a search term. Again, a number of courts found actionable use
of the mark, even when the defendant used an entirely different (non-confusing)
domain name, and consumers were never at any point exposed to the defendant's
use of the plaintiffs mark. See, e.g., Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d
808, 813 (7th Cir. 2002); Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174
F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999). Other courts declined to find a cause of action. See
Site Pro-1, Inc. v. Better Metal, LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d 123, 128 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
Finally, a number of courts have imposed liability for uses of marks to trigger
the display of pop-up advertising or banner ads, even though the uses were invisible
to consumers. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130-31 (2d
Cir. 2009); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034
(9th Cir. 2004). Others have declined to do so, for lack of actionable "use." See, e.g.,
Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 773 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
In addition, there is relatively little uniformity of reasoning.
For further discussion of these and similar cases, see generally Margreth Bar-
rett, Domain Names, Trademarks and the First Amendment: Searching for Meaningful
Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 1013-14 (2007) [hereinafter Domain Names, Trade-
marks, and the First Amendment]; Margreth Barrett, Internet Trademark Suits and the De-
mise of "Trademark Use," 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 396-402 (2006) [hereinafter Inter-
net Trademark Suits].
' For a partial listing of the scholarly literature addressing this issue, see Margreth
Barrett, Finding Trademark Use: The Historical Foundation for Limiting Infringement Liabil-
ity to Uses "In the Manner of a Mark, "43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 893, 899 (2008) [herein-
after Finding Trademark Use].
'Several commentators have suggested that imposing a "trademark use" requirement
on infringement plaintiffs renders the fair use defense superfluous: if the plaintiff
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which is codified in Lanham Act § 33(b) (4), provides that in
cases involving marks comprised of surnames or descriptive or
geographically descriptive words or symbols, infringement de-
fendants may avoid liability by demonstrating that their use
was made "in good faith," "otherwise than as a mark," only to
describe their goods or services or their geographic origin.
In a previous article, I reviewed the common-law and
federal trademark statutes as they existed prior to Congress'
enactment of the Lanham Act, along with the legislative his-
tory of the Lanham Act, to conclude that these sources all
point to the existence of a "trademark use" limitation on direct
infringement liability.6 They suggest that "trademark use," for
this purpose, should entail at least three requirements: 1) con-
sumers should be able to perceive the defendant's application
of the allegedly infringing word or symbol; 2) the defendant
should closely and directly associate the allegedly confusing
word or symbol with goods or services that the defendant is
advertising or offering for sale or distribution; and 3) the de-
fendant's use of the allegedly infringing word or symbol
should make a separate commercial impression on consum-
7
ers.
In this article, I look to historic sources to evaluate the
relationship of the Lanham Act's trademark use requirement
to the fair use defense. I conclude that the trademark use re-
quirement and the fair use defense are consistent and work
together to strike the balance of competing interests that Con-
gress sought to establish in the Lanham Act.
The requirement that infringement plaintiffs demon-
strate the defendant's "trademark use" serves a screening or
gate-keeping function, limiting liability for direct infringement
must demonstrate that the infringement defendant made a trademark use of the mark
as part of its case-in-chief, then it would be impossible for a defendant to demon-
strate use "otherwise than as a mark" and avail himself of the fair use defense. See
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion over Use: Contextualism in Trademark
Law, 92 IOwA L. REv. 1597, 1617 (2007); Lisa P. Ramsey, Increasing First Amendment
Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 381, 455 n.432 (2008); Mark P.
McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source in Trademark Law, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REv. 773, 797, 802-05 (2009). But see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding
Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IowA L. REv. 1669, 1683-85 (2007) (argu-
ing that the trademark use requirement "does not make the statutory fair use provi-
sion in 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4) superfluous").
5 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4) (2006).
Barrett, Finding Trademark Use, supra, note 4, at 893.
Id., at 964-77. While the trademark use requirement, as defined, would significantly
reduce the ability of trademark owners to control others' uses of their marks in the
Internet context, the limitation would better serve a host of competing interests:
promoting beneficial on-line competition; ensuring the unfettered flow of useful
marketplace information to consumers; development of innovative, efficient custom-
ized digital indexing, reference and search services for consumers; and protecting
First Amendment expressive interests. See also Barrett, supra note 3, at 450-56.
[Vol. 28:1
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to those cases in which potential consumer confusion is likely
to be material and detrimental from a societal standpoint." As
defined above, the "trademark use" requirement provides a
relatively straightforward, objective means of determining
whether consumers are likely to look to the defendant's appli-
cation of the contested word or symbol for information about
product or service source, without resorting to complex, fact-
intensive investigation of actual consumer perceptions. This,
in turn, enables courts to identify cases in which potential con-
sumer confusion costs are unlikely to justify the societal costs
of protracted litigation, and to dispose of them early in the liti-
gation process. The initial showing of trademark use, as de-
fined, limits the chilling effects that threats of protracted, ex-
pensive infringement litigation may have on marketplace
actors seeking to make socially beneficial uses of marks, and
protects First Amendment interests by limiting infringement
claims, in most cases, to a defendant's commercial speech.
The fair use defense is meant to accommodate the spe-
cial concerns that arise when businesses claim exclusive rights
in surnames and descriptive words and symbols. A competitive
marketplace (and the traditional interest in using one's own
name in business) requires that all marketplace actors be able
to use surnames and descriptive and geographically descriptive
words and symbols truthfully to communicate relevant infor-
mation about their goods or services to consumers. Permitting
one competitor to exclude all others from such use would
sharply impair the flow of useful marketplace information to
consumers and inhibit competition.9 Historical analysis of
early common-law, post-Lanham Act fair use decisions and a
line of recent Supreme Court decisions all indicate that the
fair use defense should focus on the defendant's purpose in ap-
plying a surname or descriptive word or symbol, not on the likely
impact of the use on consumers. The defendant's purpose is de-
termined through examination of circumstantial evidence.
The fair use defense provides defendants who are acting in
good faith leeway to use words and symbols in their primary
(surname or descriptive) meaning, even if consumers may
perceive the use as source-indicating.
Thus, even though an infringement plaintiff demon-
strates that the defendant made a "trademark use" of its sur-
8 See infra notes 206-13, and accompanying text.
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122
2004).
See infra notes 135-205 and accompanying text.
5
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name, descriptive mark, or geographically descriptive mark
(that is, shows that the defendant closely, directly associated
the contested word or symbol with products or services that it
was advertising or selling, in a manner perceptible to consum-
ers and that makes a separate commercial impression), and
even though the plaintiff demonstrates that this trademark use
is likely to confuse consumers, the defendant can avoid liability
by demonstrating that it applied the word or symbol, in good
faith, merely for the purpose of describing its own goods or ser-
vices.
Part II, infra, will describe the historical context in which
both the trademark use and the fair use doctrines arose, and
discuss how both concepts co-existed in the common law." It
will then discuss how Congress incorporated both doctrines
into the Lanham Act-the trademark use requirement in
Lanham Act §§ 32(1) (a), 43(a) and 45, and the exception to
liability for "fair" uses of surnames and descriptive and geo-
graphically descriptive words and symbols in Lanham Act §
33(b) (4).'
Part III will then focus on the meaning of "fair use" in
light of the doctrine's historical roots, first examining a series
of pre-Lanham Act Supreme Court and Circuit Court decisions
that established and defined the concept, 3 then turning to leg-
islative history and more modern decisions defining the fair
use defense as enacted in Lanham Act § 33(b) (4) . Part IIIC
will conclude that the proper standard for evaluating whether
a defendant's use was "in good faith," "otherwise than as a
mark," for purposes of the § 33(b) (4), is the defendant's pur-
pose in making the use, as evidenced by the manner of its use
and other circumstantial evidence. It will explain why a
"purpose standard better serves the goals of the fair use de-
fense,16 and how this standard is consistent with a recent line of
Supreme Court decisions, and is even compelled by the Su-
preme Court's decision in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Last-
ing Impression I, Inc."
Part IV will then briefly explain how the fair use defense
does not conflict with the requirement that plaintiffs demon-
strate the defendant's "trademark use," but rather works with
See infra Part Il-IIB.
See infta Part 11C.
See infra Part IIIA.
5 See infra Part IIIB.
See infra Part 11C.
See infta notes 189-205, and accompanying text.
543 U.S. 111 (2004). See infra notes 196-205, and accompanying text.
[Vol. 28:1
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the requirement to provide a proper balance of competing so-
cietal interests in trademark infringement cases.' 8 Section IV
will conclude with a number of examples of cases in which
courts have found an exonerating "fair use," notwithstanding
the fact that the defendant's actions clearly constituted
"trademark use."
II. THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE "TRADEMARK
USE" AND "FAIR USE" DOCTRINES
Throughout the development of trademark and unfair
competition law, courts have recognized the need to balance a
range of competing interests. In order to have an efficient,
competitive marketplace, consumers must have the means to
easily and quickly distinguish the goodsm of competing pro-
ducers and exercise their purchasing preferences. Thus, each
producer must be able to adopt a word or symbol (a "mark" or
"trademark") that readily identifies it as the source of its
goods, and prohibit other producers from adopting a confus-
ingly similar mark that may mislead consumers and cause
them to make mistaken purchases. Affording merchants ex-
clusive rights in the marks they adopt provides multiple bene-
fits: it reduces consumer search costs, promotes marketplace
efficiency, protects both consumers and other marketplace ac-
tors against deceptive and fraudulent practices, enables pro-
ducers to reap the benefits of their investment in product
quality and business good will, and thus provides an incentive
for producers to strive for high quality.
I See infta Part IV.
In this section I will refer to the "goods," "merchandise" or "products" of market-
place actors. Early case law focused primarily on marks for tangible goods, and the law
of technical trademarks was limited to protecting marks that distinguished goods, as
were the early federal trademark acts. While marks used to identify services might be
protected through an action for unfair competition, federal law had relatively little
specifically to say about marks for services prior to the enactment of the Lanham Act
in 1946. However, it would be fair, in discussing the common-law unfair competition
cause of action for "trade name" (or secondary meaning mark) infringement, to as-
sume that similar rules might apply, regardless of whether the secondary meaning
mark at issue identified its user's products or services. The Restatement of Torts de-
fined a "trade name" as:
any designation which
(a) is adopted and used by a person to denominate goods which he mar-
kets or services which he renders or a business which he conducts, or has
come to be so used by others, and
(b) through its association with such goods, services or business, has acquired
a special significance as the name thereof, and
(c) the use of which for the purpose stated in Clause (a) is prohibited nei-
ther by a legislative enactment nor by an otherwise defined public policy.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 716 (1938) (emphasis added).
2 The Supreme Court has stated:
7
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On the other hand, an efficient, competitive market-
place requires that competing producers have adequate means
to communicate the nature, qualities, and characteristics of
their products to interested consumers without unwarranted
interference. Thus, it is problematic to permit individual mer-
chants to assert exclusive rights in words or symbols that others
may legitimately need for this purpose. If merchants are
granted trademark rights in words or symbols that describe
their products, they may be able (individually or collectively)
to prevent others from effectively describing their competing
goods to prospective purchasers, and thus impair competition
and establish product "monopolies."21  They may be able to
claim exclusive rights in their surnames, and thus prevent oth-
ers with the same name from using it to notify consumers of
their role in manufacturing or selling their own products." A
single producer of goods in a desirable geographic area may
be able to assert trademark rights in the geographic name of
the place, and thus deny its neighbors the benefits arising
from associating their own goods with it.13  Moreover, overly
In principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-
identifying mark, "reduce [s] the customer's costs of shopping and making
purchasing decisions," for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer
that this item-the item with this mark-is made by the same producer as
other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in the past.
At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitat-
ing competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associ-
ated with a desirable product. The law thereby "encourage[s] the produc-
tion of quality products," and simultaneously discourages those who hope
to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer's inability quickly to
evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale.
Qualitex Co. v.Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (quoting 1 J.
T. MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 201(2), (3d
ed. 1994)). See also S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946) ("Trade-marks, indeed, are the
essence of competition, because they make possible a choice between competing ar-
ticles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other. Trade-marks encour-
age the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the good
reputation which excellence creates.").
21 As the Supreme Court explained in Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323-24 (1871):
No one can claim protection for the exclusive use of a trade-mark or trade-
name which would practically give him a monopoly in the sale of any goods
other than those produced or made by himself. If he could, the public
would be injured rather than protected, for competition would be de-
stroyed. . . . "[A merchant] has no right to appropriate a sign or a symbol,
which, from the nature of the fact it is used to signify, others may employ
with equal truth, and therefore have an equal right to employ for the same
purpose.
See also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L. J. 367, 371 (1999)
(trademark law balances the competitive interests at stake by tailoring protection to
minimize material consumer deception without discouraging competitive entry).
For many years, courts believed that "the right to do business under one's own
name is one of the sacred rights known to the law," a "natural and inalienable right."
2 RUDOLF CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS, §85.2
(1945) (quoting Ida May Co. v. Ensign, 20 Cal. App. 2d 339, 66 P.2d 727 (1937); and
Hilton v. Hilton, 89 N.J. Eq.182, 183, 104 A. 375 (1918)). See infra note 42.See Canal Co., 90 U.S. at 324-25:
HeinOnline  -- 28 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 8 2010-2011
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generous trademark rights in any kind of word or symbol may
enable mark owners to block others from referring to their
products in the course of comparative advertising, to the det-
riment of consumers.24 They might also assert trademark
rights to censor critical product critiques and commentary, not
only by their competitors, but also by dissatisfied consumers
and the media.2 ' This, of course, would impair First Amend-
ment interests, as well as impair competition by choking the
essential flow of useful marketplace information to consumers.
In developing the common law, American courts recon-
ciled these competing concerns by crafting two separate causes of
action to regulate interests in product marks: 1) the cause of
action for technical trademark infringement and 2) the unfair
competition cause of action for trade name (or "secondary
meaning mark")26 infringement. Courts correlated the con-
[I]t is obvious that the same reasons which forbid the exclusive appropria-
tion of generic names or of those merely descriptive of the article manufac-
tured and which can be employed with truth by other manufacturers, apply
with equal force to the appropriation of geographical names, designating
districts of country. . .. [C]ould they be appropriated exclusively, the ap-
propriation would result in mischievous monopolies. Could such phrases
as "Pennsylvania wheat," "Kentucky hemp," "Virginia tobacco," or "Sea Is-
land cotton," be protected as trade-marks; could any one prevent all others
from using them, or from selling articles produced in the districts they de-
scribe under those appellations, it would greatly embarrass trade, and se-
cure exclusive rights to individuals in that which is the common right of
24 many.
See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968) (suit by owner of pres-
tigious "Chanel No. 5" mark for perfume alleges infringement against manufacturer
of a knock-off perfume, seeking to enjoin him from truthfully telling consumers that
his "Ta'Ron Second Chance" perfume smells like "Chanel No. 5").
25 See, e.g., L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1987)
(owner of L.L. Bean mark for mail-order clothing and outdoor equipment seeks to
hold adult magazine liable for publishing a parody of its catalog); Bally Total Fitness
Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (owner of "Bally Total
Fitness" mark for fitness clubs sues to enjoin dissatisfied customer's use of "Bally-
sucks.com" as domain name for gripe site airing his complaints about the club).
26 Prior to 1946, when the Lanham Act was enacted, courts generally described the
unfair competition cause of action as providing rights in trade names. "Trade name"
was a broad term, encompassing descriptive, geographically descriptive, and surname
marks for products, service marks, and business names. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS, supra, note 20; JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADE
NAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 3 (2d ed. 1905); 1 HARRY D. NIMS, THE LAw OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS, § 185 (4th ed. 1947). However, this article
focuses primarily on the unfair competition rules regarding infringement of marks,
rather than on the names of businesses. When Congress enacted the Lanham Act, it
defined the term "trademark" to include words, names, symbols or devices used to
identify the source of the user's product. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2009). It provided for
"service marks," which it defined as including words, names, symbols and devices
used to identify the source of the user's services. Id. It redefined the term "trade
name" to refer only to the name of a business. Id. That is the terminology that most
modem trademark practitioners and scholars use today.
In an attempt to avoid reader confusion, I will use the term "secondary meaning
mark" in reference to common, descriptive, geographically descriptive and surname
marks that might be protected under the common-law cause of action for unfair
competition, rather than the (once broader) term "trade name." However, to the
extent that this article includes quotations from judicial or other pre-Lanham Act
HeinOnline  -- 28 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 9 2010-2011
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tours of these two causes of action to the contrasting social im-
pact of: 1) permitting merchants to appropriate fanciful,
coined, or arbitrary words or symbols to their exclusive use;
and 2) allowing them to appropriate surnames and existing
descriptive and geographically descriptive words and symbols.
Courts crafted the technical trademark infringement cause of
action to provide merchants with strong, property-like rights in
fanciful, coined, or arbitrary ("inherently distinctive") words or
symbols that they adopted to identify their goods. In con-
trast, courts crafted the unfair competition cause of action
only to recognize and enforce rights in surnames, descriptive
or geographically descriptive words or symbols when the
claimant could demonstrate: 1) that it had acquired secondary
(trademark) meaning in the word or symbol; 2) that the de-
fendant used the word or symbol in a "secondary" (trademark)
sense, rather than its "primary" (surname, descriptive, or geo-
graphically descriptive) sense; and 3) that the defendant acted
with fraudulent intent to deceive consumers about the source
of its goods.
As will be explained below, today's "trademark use" re-
quirement arose primarily from the law of technical trademark
infringement, which required plaintiffs to demonstrate that
the defendant "affixed" the allegedly infringing mark to prod-
ucts that it was offering for sale, or otherwise associated the
mark closely with its products in the course of marketing or
advertising them.2 9 The "fair use" doctrine, in contrast, arose
from the unfair competition cause of action for secondary
meaning mark infringement. It represents the courts' at-
tempts to preserve marketplace actors' ability to use words and
symbols in their "primary" descriptive or surname meaning,
without interference from competitors who claim to have ap
propriated them through acquisition of secondary meaning.
Subpart A will describe the unfair competition cause of
action for secondary meaning mark infringement, and more
sources that refer to "trade names," readers should understand the reference to
mean (among other things) secondary meaning marks, as defined above.
" See infra Part II B.
28 See infra Part II A. For a useful discussion of how these two causes of action devel-
oped, and the courts' reasoning in shaping them as they did, see Daniel M. McClure,
Trademarks and Unfair Competition: A Critical History of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK
REP. 305 (1979).
' See infra Part II B. A corresponding but looser "close association" requirement ex-
isted in the common-law unfair competition cause of action for infringement of sec-
ondary meaning marks, and when federal registration became available for secon-
dary meaning marks, the federal statutory "affixation or other close association"
requirement that applied to technical trademarks was extended to them. See infra
notes 71-86, 100-103 and accompanying text.
* See infra Part II A.
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fully explain the judicial requirements that infringement de-
fendants 1) act with fraudulent intent, and 2) use allegedly in-
fringing words or symbols in their "secondary" (trademark)
sense or meaning, rather than their "primary" (descriptive or
surname) sense or meaning.3' Subpart B will briefly describe
the cause of action for technical trademark infringement, ex-
plain its early "affixation" requirement, and describe the evo-
lution of that requirement into a broader "affixation or other
close association," or "trademark use," requirement. 2
Subpart C will explain how, in 1946, Congress consoli-
dated the common-law doctrines of technical trademark in-
fringement and unfair competition in the Lanham Act's causes
of action for "trademark infringement."3  The Lanham Act
provided registration procedures for both technical trade-
marks and secondary meaning marks," and a single standard
for "trademark infringement" that was applicable to both kinds
of marks, whether registered or unregistered.3 5 In §§ 32(a) (1)
and 43(a), the Lanham Act required all plaintiffs in infringe-
ment cases to demonstrate that the defendant "affixed or oth-
erwise closely associated" its allegedly infringing mark to goods
or services it was advertising or offering for sale. That is, these
sections required that the plaintiff demonstrate that the de-
fendant made a "trademark use." Lanham Act § 33(b) (4),
generally known as the "fair use defense," preserved the unfair
competition law's requirement that infringement defendants
use the contested word or symbol in its "secondary" (trade-
mark) sense, rather than in its primary (surname or descrip-
tive) sense, and maintained its emphasis on the defendant's
state of mind.
Thus, this section will demonstrate how the "trademark
use" and "fair use" doctrines arose from different aspects of
the common-law regulation of rights in marks, served different
purposes, and were ultimately codified as separate and distinct
considerations in the Lanham Act infringement causes of ac-
tion. Subsequent sections will discuss the appropriate stan-
dard for determining § 33(b) (4) fair use, in light of its com-
"Id.
"See infta Part II B. Subsection B will also briefly discuss how a similar requirement
was extended to unfair competition causes of action for secondary meaning mark
infringement.
' See infta Part II C.
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1052.
' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) (a), 1125(a).
" 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4).
37 Id.
11
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mon-law history, judicial interpretation, and legislative intent,38
and will explain how that standard differs from the standard
for judging whether the defendant made a "trademark use," as
required under §§ 32(a) (1) and 43(a).
A. The Unfair Competition Cause ofAction for Secondary Meaning
Mark Infringement
The early common law declined to afford merchants ex-
clusive rights in words or symbols (or combinations of words
or symbols) that described their user's product, described the
product's geographical origin, or constituted a surname or
designation common to the trade.40 Numerous marketplace
actors might legitimately want or need to use such words and
symbols in communicating the nature and qualities of their
goods to consumers, and a robust, efficient marketplace de-
pended on their ability to do so freely. Thus, the early com-
mon law releiated such words and symbols to the commons,
for use by all. While a business might adopt such a word or
- See infra Part III.
9 See infra Part IV. I have discussed the evolution of the "trademark use" require-
ment in depth in an earlier article. See Barrett, supra note 4. Thus, with regard to
that doctrine, the following sections will mainly restate the conclusions I reached in
the earlier article, and provide citations to the earlier analysis and supporting au-
thorities.
40 Howe Scale Co. v. Wyekoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118 (1905); Columbia
Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460 (1893); Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg.
Co., 220 U.S. 446 (1911); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S.
665 (1901); 2 Callmann, supra note 23, at § 66.1; Milton Handler & Charles Pickett,
Trade-Marks and Trade Names-An Analysis and Synthesis: I, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 168, 169
(1930) (hereinafter "Handler & Pickett I").
The practice of refusing to recognize trademark rights in common, surname and
descriptive words and symbols promoted efficient marketplace competition, prevent-
ing individual businesses from monopolizing language in a manner that might en-
able them to erect barriers to entry or to "monopolize" product markets. Canal Co. v.
Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323 (1872); Handler and Pickett I, supra, note 41 at 170. It also
protected First Amendment interests. See Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free
Speech, 27 COLUM.J. L. & ARTS 187, 189-92 (2004).
The common law did not view surnames in quite the same manner that it
viewed descriptive and geographically descriptive words and symbols. In the case of
surnames, courts emphasized the private, individual interest that each person has in
using his or her own name in business, rather than the other, more general competi-
tion-related considerations noted above. Commentators have characterized the
common-law rules regarding surnames as distinct from, but parallel to the rules re-
garding descriptive and geographically descriptive words and symbols. See, e.g., Ru-
dolf Callmann, Trademark Infringement and Unfair Competition, 14 LAw & CONTEMP.
PRoBS. 183, 196-98 (1949) (hereinafter "Callman Article"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28, cmt. a (1995) (characterizing the surname rule as
"analogous" to the rule regarding rights in descriptive and geographically descriptive
words and symbols). However, the manner in which the courts accommodated a
claimant's interest in exclusivity and a defendant's interest in using surname marks
was highly similar to the manner in which they accommodated those parties' interest
in descriptive and geographically descriptive words and symbols, and the Lanham
Act lumped surnames and descriptive terms together in codifying the common-law
"fair use" doctrine. Since any differences between surnames and descriptive or geo-
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symbol to identify its product, it had no right to expect exclu-
sivity.4 The courts made it clear that the interest in unfet-
tered, truthful use of language in its ordinary or descriptive
meaning outweighed concerns about potential consumer con-
fusion.
Courts did, of course, recognize that competitors' con-
current use of descriptive or surname words or symbols could
lead to consumer confusion: when a merchant heavily stressed
a surname or a descriptive word or symbol in marketing its
goods, or employed such a word or symbol for a long period of
time, consumers might come to associate it with that mer-
chant's particular business good will. When those consumers
later encountered the same word or symbol in association with
a competitor's goods or services, they might understand it to
indicate source in the initial, heavy or long-term user. In such
cases (when the surname or descriptive word or symbol had
acquired a "secondary meaning," as an indication of source),
courts were willing to intervene if doing so would not interfere
with the interest in unfettered, truthful use of language in its
ordinary or descriptive meaning.4
graphically descriptive words and symbols are immaterial for purposes of this article,
I will treat them as a single category, without differentiation.
4 As one court put it:
The alphabet, English vocabulary, and Arabic numerals are to man, in con-
veying his thoughts, feelings and the truth, what air, light, and water are to
him in the enjoyment of his physical being. Neither can be taken from him.
They are the common property of mankind, in which all have an equal
share and character of interest. From these fountains whosoever will may
drink, but an exclusive right to do so cannot be acquired by any.
Avery & Sons v. Meikle & Co., 81 Ky. 73, 90 (Ky. 1883). See also Elgin Nat'l Watch
Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 673 (1901) ("[N]o sign or form of words
can be appropriated as a valid trademark which, from the nature of the fact conveyed
by its primary meaning, others may employ with equal truth and with equal right for
the same purpose"); Fetridge v. Wells, 4 Abb. Pr. 144, 146, 13 How Pr. 385, (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1857) (Rights in descriptive terms would be "a species of property that . . . can
only be given to one by the infringement of the rights of all."). See also Grafton Du-
lany Cushing, On Certain Cases Analogous to Trade-Marks, 4 HARV. L. REV. 321, 322
(1890) (explaining why certain words and symbols were excluded from trademark
Rrotection).
As the Supreme Court explained in Canal Co. v. Clark
True it may be that the use by a second producer, in describing truthfully
his product, of a name or a combination of words already in use by an-
other, may have the effect of causing the public to mistake as to the origin
or ownership of the product, but if it is just as true in its application to his
goods as it is to those of another who first applied it, and who therefore
claims an exclusive right to use it, there is no legal or moral wrong done.
Purchasers may be mistaken, but they are not deceived by false representa-
tions, and equity will not enjoin against telling the truth.
80 U.S. 311, 327 (1871). See also William R. Warner & Co. v. Ely Lilly & Co., 265 U.S.
526 (1924).
" Elgin Nat'1 Watch Co., supra note 41; Computing Scale Co. v. Standard Computing
Scale Co., 118 F. 965 (6th Cir. 1902); Chickering v. Chickering & Sons, 215 F. 490
(7th Cir. 1914); 2 Callmann, supra, note 23, § 85, at 1350-51; Zachariah Chafee, Jr.,
Unfair Competition, 53 HARV. L. REV. 1289, 1295-96 (1940); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS,
HeinOnline  -- 28 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 13 2010-2011
14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT
Courts reasoned that while the common law permitted
all competitors to employ surnames and descriptive words and
symbols in their primary (surname or descriptive) meaning, it
did not permit them to use such words or symbols for the pur-
pose of committing fraud.45 Thus, when competitors used a sur-
name or a descriptive word or symbol to indicate source,
rather than merely to describe their goods or services, and did
so with the intent to confuse consumers, courts should inter-
vene. They did not intervene on the ground that the plaintiff
had property rights in the surname or descriptive word or
symbol (as might be the case with regard to a technical trade-
mark), but because the defendant/competitor was engaged
in deliberate misconduct.47 As one court explained:
The infringement of trade-marks is the violation by one
person of an exclusive right of another person to the use of
a word, mark or symbol. Unfair competition in trade, as
supra note 20 at § 715 cmt. d.
45As the Eighth Circuit put it:
Everyone has the right to use and enjoy the rays of the sun, but no one may
lawfully focus them to burn his neighbor's house . .. Every one has the
right to use pen, ink and paper, but no one may apply them to the purpose
of defrauding his neighbor of his property, or making counterfeit money,
or of committing forgery.
Shaver v. Heller & Merz Co., 108 F. 821, 827 (8th Cir. 1901). See also Cushing, supra
note 43, at 324:
The distinction between the law of trade-marks and of cases analogous to
trade-marks [secondary meaning marks] I understand to be this: In cases of
trade-marks there is a definite exclusive right, which may be infringed in
certain definite ways. The right is recognized as being exclusively the
plaintiffs, and, indeed, it is by virtue of his exclusive right that he gets re-
lief. Unless he has a trade-mark within these technical rules he has no ex-
clusive right and can get no relief .... In cases analogous to trade-marks,
the right of the plaintiff is only against a particular defendant by reason of
his fraud....
See 1 NIMS, supra note 27, at 66-70 (noting that technical trademarks often were
referred to as property rights, although that characterization was sometimes dis-
puted); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 20, at § 717, cmt. a (explaining that for a
period of time, some courts in equity characterized the plaintiffs technical trade-
mark as "property," but that this view did not ultimately prevail. However, it helped
to establish the rule that fraud was not an essential element of technical trademark
infringement (as opposed to secondary meaning mark infringement.). See also
Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in Trademark Law,
86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 560-72 (2006) (describing the historical development and de-
cline of the notion that technical trademarks constitute "property.").
" Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 551 (1891); Elgin Nat.
Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901); L.E. Waterman Co. v.
Modern Pen Co., 235 U.S. 88 (1914); James Love Hopkins, supra note 27, at § 19 pp.
40-41; Grafton Dulany Cushing, supra note 43, at 323-24. See Milton Handler &
Charles Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names-An Analysis and Synthesis: II, 30 Co-
lumbia L. Rev. 757, 769 (1930) (hereafter "Handler & Pickett II") (In unfair compe-
tition-as contrasted to technical trademark cases-fraud was said to be "the essence of
the wrong."); Hopkins, supra, at 35 ("If the use of any words, numerals or symbols is
adopted for the purpose of defrauding the public, the courts will interfere to protect the
public from such fraudulent intent, even though the person asking the intervention
of the court may not have the exclusive right to use these words, numerals or sym-
bols") (emphasis added) (quoting Charles E. Coddington, Digest, § 36 (1877)).
[Vol. 28:1
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distinguished from infringement of trademarks, does not
involve the violation of any exclusive right to the use of a
word, mark or symbol.... [Secondary meaning marks are]
open to public use 'like the adjectives of the language,' yet
there may be unfair competition in trade by an improper
use of such word, mark or symbol. Two rivals in business
competing with each other in the same line of goods may
have an equal right to use the same words, marks or sym-
bols on similar articles produced or sold by them respec-
tively, yet if such words, marks or symbols were used by one
of them before the other and by association have come to
indicate to the public that the goods to which they are ap-
plied are of the production of the former, the latter will not
be permitted, with intent to mislead the public, to use such
words, marks or symbols in such a manner. . . as to deceive
or be capable of deceiving the public as to the origin,
manufacture or ownership of the articles to which they are
applied ....
Thus, the unfair competition cause of action for in-
fringement of secondary meaning marks represented a judicial
balancing of the competing social interests in: 1) preventing
consumer confusion; 2) regulating deliberate, fraudulent con-
duct; and 3) retaining general marketplace access to surnames
and descriptive words and symbols. When a claimant's de-
scriptive, geographically descriptive, or surname word or sym-
bol acquired secondary (trademark) meaning by virtue of its
long and/or heavy use, competitors could employ the word or
symbol in its "primary" sense (that is, in its non-trademark, de-
scriptive, geographic, or surname sense), but the claimant
could prevent them from deliberately, fraudulently employing
the word or symbol in a secondary (trademark, or source-
49
indicating) sense.
Courts purported to require unfair competition plain-
tiffs to demonstrate both the defendant's use of the contested
word or symbol for a secondary (trademark) meaning and the
defendant's fraudulent, bad-faith intent to pass off its business,
goods, or services as those of the plaintiff. However, as will be
discussed in a later section,5o these two requirements over-
lapped significantly and were frequently evaluated in an undif-
" Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 94 F. 651, 659 (C.C. Del. 1899) (emphasis
added).
" Nat'1 Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1901); 2 Nims, supra note
27, at § 319, pp. 1016-1017; Grover C. Grismore, Fraudulent Intent in Trademark Cases,
27 MICH. L. REv. 857, 863-64 (1929); Handler & Pickett I, supra note 41, at 181-83.
0 See Part IIIA, infra.
15
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ferentiated manner, through consideration of the same evi-
dence. Scrutiny of this case law suggests that the "use for sec-
ondary meaning" and "fraudulent intent" requirements might
best be characterized as a single inquiry, or at least as two sides
of the same coin.
The Supreme Court imposed the bad faith, fraudulent
intent requirement in a number of its decisions.5 ' However, as
time passed and the United States progressed into the twenti-
eth century, courts and commentators increasingly began to
criticize the fraudulent intent requirement, reasoning that
technical trademark infringement and infringement of secon-
dary meaning marks caused the same injury to business good
will and consumer reliance interests, and that all infringement
cases should focus on the effect of the defendant's acts, rather
than on the defendant's intent.5 Some noteworthy commen-
tators even called for elimination of the distinction between
technical trademark infringement and unfair competition, and
for unification of the two causes of action. In unfair competi-
tion cases, courts grew to infer the requisite fraudulent intent
from circumstantial evidence-such as the defendant's adop-
tion of a print style or color that simulated the plaintiffs pres-
entation of the secondary meaning mark, or the defendant's
emphasis on or placement of the mark on its product or pack-
aging-that might suggest an intent to use the contested word
5 McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877) (proof of fraudulent intent to deceive is
required in unfair competition cases); Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138
U.S. 537 (1891) (It is necessary to prove intent in cases where no fanciful trademark
is involved); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1901) (If
the plaintiff has demonstrated a technical trademark infringement the defendant's
wrongful or fraudulent intent is presumed; but in the case of trade names with sec-
ondary meaning, "such circumstances must be made out as will show wrongful intent
in fact, or justify that inference from the inevitable consequences of the act com-
plained of"); Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids, 233 U.S. 461, 471 (1914) (suggesting
that when secondary meaning marks were federally registered under the Trademark
Act of 1905 "10-year rule," the registrant did not need to demonstrate wrongful in-
tent on the defendant's part, but implying that proof of wrongful intent would be
required under the common law (unfair competition) cause of action for infringe-
ment of unregistered secondary meaning marks).
In contrast, by the late 1800's, English courts had moved away from requiring
fraudulent intent in unfair competition cases, 2 NIMs, supra note 27, at § 351, pp.
1087, 1089, as had a significant number of state courts. Id. at 1089. Nims also lists
and discusses some lower federal court decisions that appeared not to require a
demonstration of fraud in secondary meaning mark infringement (unfair competi-
tion) cases, though he suggests that this may have resulted at least in part from those
courts' mistaken reliance on precedent from technical trademark decisions.
52 See e.g., 2 Callmann, supra note 23, § 86.1(a), at 1399, 1401; 2 NIMS, supra note 27,
at § 351; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 20, § 717 cmt. a; Grismore, supra note
50, at 866.
" See e.g., Handler & Pickett I, supra note 41; Handler & Pickett II, supra note 48; 2
Callmann, supra note 23, § 86.1 (a), at 1400-03. See also I NIMs, supra note 27, at 513
(suggesting the growing tendency (in 1926) to minimize the distinction between
technical trademarks and secondary meaning marks).
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or symbol in a secondary (source indicating) sense, and thus
54
to confuse consumers.
B. The Technical Trademark Infringement Cause of Action and the
"Affixation or Other Close Association" Requirement
"Technical trademarks," as recognized in the common
law, were marks that we would consider "inherently distinctive"
today: words and symbols, or combinations of words and sym-
bols, that were "fanciful, arbitrary, unique, distinctive, and
non-descriptive in character," and which the claimant had
physically affixed to articles of merchandise.
In crafting the cause of action for technical trademark
infringement, courts reasoned that a business could legiti-
mately appropriate a fanciful or arbitrary word or symbol to its
sole, exclusive use, with no great harm to competition. A
technical trademark, by definition, was either made up (and
thus had no meaning) or had a meaning that bore no descrip-
tive or other apparent relationship to the user's product.
Thus, competitors had no legitimate reason to adopt a similar
word or symbol to identify or describe their similar goods.56 If
they did adopt a similar mark, it could be assumed that they
did so for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud on the mark
owner and the public.
5 2 NIMS, supra note 27, §§ 351, 359; 2 Callmann, supra note 23, § 86.1 (a); Grismore,
supra note 50, at 864-65.
As applied by the courts, the fraud requirement in unfair competition cases
became less stringent than the fraud entailed in an action for deceit, and came to
mean little more than a conscious, bad-faith use of a confusingly similar mark. Han-
dler & Pickett II, supra note 48, at 770.
2 Callmann, supra note 23, § 66.1. See also Handler & Pickett 1, supra note 41, at
169. THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 715, supra note 20, provided the following defi-
nition of a common-law technical trademark:
A trade-mark is any mark, word, letter, number, design, picture or combi-
nation thereof in any form of arrangement, which
(a) is adopted and used by a person to denominate goods which he mar-
kets,
and
(b) is affixed to the goods, and
(c) is not . .. a common or generic name for the goods or a picture of
them, or a geographical, personal, or corporate or other association name,
or a designation descriptive of the goods or of their quality, ingredients,
properties or functions, and
(d) the use of which for the purpose stated in Clause (a) is prohibited nei-
ther by legislative enactment nor by an otherwise defined public policy.
See Almond G. Shepard, Protection of Descnptive Word Used as Trademark, 11 ME L.
REV. 103, 104 (1917-18) (unlike in the case of descriptive words or phrases, the pub-
lic has no right to "invented" words or phrases).
5 See, e.g., AuntJemima Mills Co. v. Rigney, 247 F. 407, 409 (2d Cir. 1917) ("To use
precisely the same mark as the defendants have done, is, in our opinion, evidence of
intention to make something out of it-either to get the benefit of the complainant's
reputation or of its advertisement or to forestall the extension of its trade. There is
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Because protection of technical trademarks threatened
no significant interference with competitors' ability to describe
their products to consumers, courts provided exclusive rights,
to enable technical trademark owners to protect the source-
indicating function of their marks. To acquire rights in a
technical trademark, the claimant need only be the first to "af-
fix" the mark to its products and offer them for sale in the or-
dinary course of business.5 And if a defendant affixed a simi-
lar mark to similar goods, courts would presume that the
defendant acted with fraudulent intent," and might also pre-
sume a likelihood of confusion. Upon finding infringement,
courts typically prohibited the defendant from all uses of the
word or symbol at issue.
Notwithstanding courts' frequent characterization of
technical trademark rights as "property" rights and "exclusive,"
it was clear that the law did not give technical trademark own-
no other conceivable reason why they should have appropriated this precise mark.").
See also Grover C. Grismore, supra note 50, at 863 (explaining how, since defendants
had no legitimate excuse for using a technical trademark, technical trademark own-
ers essentially enjoyed a property right in their marks, which did not depend on
groving the defendant's fraudulent intent.).
NIMS, supra note 27, at § 10 ("Technical trademarks are of such a character that
they may be appropriated to the use of one person exclusively, while in unfair com-
petition cases the words or symbols involved are not capable of exclusive appropria-
tion because others may rightfully use them."); CALLMANN, supra, note 23 § 66.1 at
814 (1945) (trademarks could be appropriated for the use of one person); Grover C.
Grismore, supra, note 50, at 863-64(explaining that technical trademarks, unlike sec-
ondary meaning marks, were property rights). See also Bone, supra note 47, at 552,
560-72 (explaining the history and reasoning that led courts to consider technical
trademarks as "property" for a period of time).
5' CALLMANN, supra note 23, at 1696-97; NIMS, supra note 27, at § 218; Handler &
Pickett II, supra note 48, at 759-62. "Affixation," as it was defined in early common
law, was a rather narrow, technical requirement. The purpose of requiring a plain-
tiff's affixation as a prerequisite to ownership rights clearly was to ensure that the
claimant had used the word or symbol as a trademark, to indicate source, and thus was
in legitimate need of protection. See, e.g., NIMS, supra note 27, at § 218 (pointing out
that the plaintiffs affixation must be "appropriate to the fulfillment of the purpose
of the trade-mark. It must be so attached as to enable it to function as a trade-mark.
It must be reasonably permanent, visible, and placed so that purchasers of the goods
can use it to identify their origin."); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 20, at § 718
cmt. a. (While one might demonstrate adoption and use of a mark without affixa-
tion, the common law's technical affixation requirement avoids the necessity of re-
solving sharply disputed issues of fact.). Professors Handler and Pickett agreed that
"the act of affixation is objective evidence of adoption, proof of which can easily be
adduced for purposes of corroboration in the event that priority of appropriation is
disputed." Handler & Pickett II, supra note 48, at 760.
The Restatement also notes historical reasons why courts required affixation as a pre-
requisite to ownership-because trademarks developed from production marks,
which were necessarily affixed to the goods. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 20,
at § 718, cmt. a.
2 CALLMANN, supra note 23, § 86.1(a), at 1397; HOPKINS, supra note 27, at 44, 255-
56; Bone, supra note 47, at 568.
6' 2 CALLMANN, supra note 23, § 661.1, at 815; 1 NIMS, supra note 27, § 221b, at 669;
Handler & Pickett I, supra note 41, at 168-69. For additional background on this is-
sue, see RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 717 cmt. a (1938); Bone, supra note 47, at 564-65.
6 2 CALLMANN, supra note 23, § 661.1, at 815.
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ers exclusive rights to all uses of their inherently distinctive
words or symbols. Rather, it gave them the exclusive right to
63
use the word or symbol as an indication of product source.
In the 1800's, technical trademark infringement could
only be asserted against a defendant who "affixed" a similar
mark to similar goods.6M Affixation ensured that the defen-
dant's use of the contested word or symbol would be likely to
signal source to consumers. Indeed, prior to the advent of
modern mass market advertising practices, which commenced
in the earlier half of the twentieth century, affixation to prod-
ucts undoubtedly was the primary way that source was indi-
65cated.
While "affixation" was a rather rigid limitation, it was re-
laxed in the early 1900's to require that the defendant affix the
allegedly infringing mark either to its merchandise or to la-
bels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, or receptacles intended
to be used upon or in connection with the sale" of the mer-
chandise. 6 This more relaxed "affixation or other close asso-
0 See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 20, at § 727 and cmt. a.
r See, e.g., Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Netter, 102 F. 691, 691 (E.D.Pa. 1900) (no cause of
action for trademark infringement because the defendant had "not affixed the trade-
mark complained of to any merchandise"); Air-Brush Mfg. Co. v. Thayer, 84 F. 640,
641 (N.D. Ill. 1897) (no cause of action for trademark infringement because the de-
fendants had not "affixed complainant's registered mark to merchandise"); Ball v.
Broadway Bazaar, 194 N.Y. 429, 87 N.E. 674 (N.Y. App. Div. 1909) (plaintiff used the
word "Lilliputian" both in its business name and as a mark for its products. The de-
fendant incorporated "Lilliputian" into its business name and advertisements, but
did not use it as a mark for its own merchandise. Drawing on the affixation require-
ment, the court found that the plaintiff could recover for unfair competition, but not
technical trademark infringement). See also Trademark Act of 1881, 21 Stat 502, § 7
(emphasis added):
Any person who shall reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate any
trademark registered under this Act, and affix the same to merchandise of
substantially the same descriptive properties as those described in the
1 registration, shall be liable .... "
I NIMS, supra note 27, at § 218, 636 (suggesting that marks must be attached to
products in order to indicate source); Mark Bartholomew, Advertising and the Trans-
formation of Trademark Law, 38 N.M. L. REV. 1 (2008) (describing the introduction
and growth of modern advertising practices in the U.S.).
There are other ways one might conceivably use a word or symbol to indicate prod-
uct source, but affixation to goods or containers can be characterized as the most obvi-
ous, certain way to utilize a word or symbol to indicate source, and to ensure that con-
sumers will rely upon it for that purpose.
" See New York Mackintosh Co. v. Flam, 198 F. 571, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1912) ("A trade-
mark is something attached to the goods, or the receptacles containing them, which
the buyer sees, and by which the goods become known to the buyer."); Pure Oil Co.
v. Puritan Oil Co., 127 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1942) (Judge Learned Hand finds that the
plaintiff's trademark infringement claim is sufficient, because the defendant "does
affix an 'imitation' of the mark to 'receptacles intended to be used ... in connection
with the sale' of gasoline"); Ironite Co. v. Guarantee Waterproofing Co., 64 F.2d 608,
610 (8th Cir. 1933) (action at law for trademark infringement required showing that
defendant affixed objectionable mark to packages); Thomas A. Edison, Inc., v. Shot-
kin, 69 F. Supp. 176, 179 (D. Colo. 1946), app dismissed, 163 F.2d 1020 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 813 (1947). For other citations to cases describing or affirming
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ciation" requirement was codified in the Federal Trademark
Act of 1905,6 and again in the Trademark Act of 1920."
Courts found that a defendant's application of the contested
mark in product advertising would also satisfy the "affixation
or other close association" requirement. Thus, during the
this affixation requirement for technical trademark infringement, see Barrett, Find-
ing Trademark Use, supra note 4, at 915-16, n.89; for citations to state statutes imposing
a "defendant affixation" limitation for infringement of technical trademarks, see id.,
at 917, n.92 .
6 33 Stat. 724 § 16 (1905). More fully, § 16 imposed liability on:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner thereof, repro-
duce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate any such trademark and affix the
same to merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as those set forth
in the registration, or to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, or receptacles in-
tended to be used upon or in connection with the sale of merchandise of substantially
the same descriptive properties as those set forth in such registration, and shall use,
or shall have used, such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imita-
tion in commerce among the several states, or with a foreign nation, or
with the Indian tribes. . . ."
41 Stat. 533 § 4 (1920) (similar language). As I explained at greater length in an
earlier article, Barrett, Finding Trademark Use, supra note 4, at 915-22, a large percent-
age of the case decisions that stated and applied the "affixation" and "affixation or
other close association" requirement were federal cases involving infringement
claims brought by technical trademark owners who had registered their marks pur-
suant to the Federal Trademark Acts that preceded the Lanham Act. . Trade-Mark
Act of 1881, ch. 138, § 7, 21 Stat. 502; Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat.
724; Trade-Mark Act of 1920, ch. 104, § 4, 41 Stat. 533. These early trademark acts
all expressly required that infringement defendants "affix" or "affix or otherwise
closely associate" the alleged infringing mark to products similar to those sold by the
plaintiff. See Trade-Mark Act of 1881, ch. 138, § 7, 21 Stat. 502; Trade-Mark Act of
1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 724; Trade-Mark Act of 1920, ch. 104, § 4, 41 Stat. 533.
However, it was clearly understood at the time that those early trademark acts only codi-
Jied the common-law rights of trademark owners, and made no substantive alterations.
Dwinell-Wright Co. v. Nat'l Fruit Product Co., Inc., 129 F.2d 848, 851 (1st Cir. 1942)
("Registration of a trade-mark under the Trade-mark Act of 1905 neither enlarges
nor abridges the registrant's substantive common-law rights in the mark. The [Act],
without changing the substantive law of trademarks, provided .. . for the registration
of marks ... which, without the statute, would be entitled to legal and equitable pro-
tection."); E.F. Prichard Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co., 136 F.2d 512, 516 (6th Cir.
1943). Indeed, it was widely understood at the time that Congress had no authority to
enact substantive regulation of marks. A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Am. Steel &
Wire Co., 55 F.2d 455, 459 (C.C. Pa. 1932); Walter Derenberg, The Patent Office as
Guardian of the Public Interest in Trade-Mark Registration Proceedings, 14 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 288 (1949) ("The Act of 1905 was based on the theory that the Federal Gov-
ernment could not under the commerce clause of the Constitution enact legislation
granting substantive statutory rights to the owner of a trade-mark."). Thus, this early
"trademark use" requirement clearly originated in the common law.
G8 See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco Rubber Co., Inc., 153
F.2d 662, 666-67 (1st Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 722 (1946) (citations omitted):
[T] he court below assumed, without discussion, that the display of plain-
tiff's registered mark in defendant's advertising would constitute an in-
fringement under 15 U.S.C.A. § 96. We think that assumption is correct,
though the precedents are not so clear as they might be. Some cases have
held that, to come within the Trade-Mark Act, defendant's accused mark
must in some way be impressed upon or affixed to the goods or the wrap-
per or container thereof. We agree with Sanborn, J., dissenting in [Died-
erich v. W. Schneider Wholesale Wine & Liquor Co., 195 F. 35, 39-41 (8th
Cir. 1912)], that however much such holding may have been justified un-
der the earlier versions of the Trade-Mark Act, the broader language of the
present [1905] Act does not require any such limited view.
The use of a copy or colorable imitation of plaintiffs trade-mark in an ad-
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first half of the twentieth century, the original, restrictive "de-
fendant affixation" requirement evolved into a more general
requirement that the defendant closely or directly associate the
mark with goods it was advertising or offering for sale.
In effect, this "affixation or other close association" re-
quirement ensured that the infringement defendant used the
allegedly infringing word or symbol "as a trademark," or in a
manner that was likely to indicate the source of its goods to
consumers. Only such uses were likely to cause a serious pos-
sibility of consumer confusion, and thus justify judicial inter-
vention.
1. Distinguishing "Affixation or Other Close Association"
from "Use for Secondary (Trademark) Meaning"
The early common-law unfair competition cause of ac-
tion covered a wider array of actions than the law of technical
trademarks-extending to infringement of business names
and source indicators for services, as well as other, more direct
forms of misrepresentations about the source or characteristics
of products or services. It thus did not expressly specify how de-
fendants must associate contested words or symbols with their
products, services, or businesses. 70 However, it appears to have
vertisement of defendant's product might well amount to affixing said
mark "to labels, signs, (or) prints," intended to be used "in connection with
the sale of merchandise" within the meaning of the Act. Manifestly the es-
sential wrong of trade-mark infringement, the appropriation of the good
will of another's established mark, may be effectively accomplished by ad-
vertising matter associating that other's distinguishing mark with the prod-
uct of defendant.
See also Hygienic Prods Co. v. Judson Dunaway Corp., 81 F. Supp. 935, 943-44
(D.N.H. 1948), vacated, 178 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1949), cer. denied, 339 U.S. 948 (1950).
("The protection which is to be accorded to the legal owner of a valid trademark ex-
tends beyond the sole use thereof in the marketing of his product in various forms of
container merchandising. Even though the statute does not include the term 'adver-
tising,' it has been construed that 'signs' and 'prints' used in advertising constitute a
use of such material 'in connection with the sale of merchandise.' There is ample
authority to the effect that leaflets, display cards, and newspaper advertising will sup-
port a claim of infringement.").
The unfair competition cause of action provided relief not only for secondary
meaning mark infringement, but also for business name infringement and other
forms of "passing off" that involved fraudulent misrepresentations about the source
of products or services, but not necessarily the imitation of words or symbols that the
plaintiff used to identify his products. See I NIMS, supra note 27, at § 4; RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS, supra note 20, at §§ 711, 754. That being the case, it is not surprising that
unfair competition law did not stress this early trademark-specific "affixation" re-
quirement. See, e.g., Atlas Assur. Co. v. Atlas Ins. Co., 138 Iowa 228, 112 N.W. 232,
233 (Iowa 1907) (To limit protection to uses in connection with manufactured arti-
cles of commerce would "leave large financial interests engaged in other lines of
business wholly without the protection of the court").
Moreover, the pre-Lanham Act unfair competition cause of action focused on
the defendant's fraudulent intent, not on the invasion of a plaintiffs exclusive right
to use the word or symbol as an indication of source. While courts may have thought
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been generally understood that defendants in secondary
meaning mark infringement cases must use their allegedly in-
fringing words or symbols in close, direct association with their
71products or services, in a manner likely to indicate source.
This less defined "trademark use" requirement might
seem to overlap the unfair competition "use for secondary
(trademark) meaning" requirement at first glance. However,
these common-law requirements served different purposes.
The looser unfair competition "trademark use" requirement
was meant to ensure that consumers would likely understand
the contested word or symbol to indicate source. The purpose
of the "use for secondary meaning" requirement was to ensure
that surnames and descriptive words and symbols remained
available for competitors to use for descriptive purposes.
In 1938, the drafters of the Restatement of Torts under-
took to simplify and consolidate the law of technical trademark
infringement and the law of unfair competition. They created
a single, flexible, all-purpose "defendant use" standard: Re-
statement section 717 provided that, to be liable for infringe-
ment, a defendant must use an allegedly infringing technical
trademark or secondary meaning mark "in the manner of a
trade-mark or trade name."7  Restatement section 727 elabo-
rated that use "in the manner of a trade-mark or trade name"
was a use that was "likely to indicate source to consumers.m
The Restatement's "use in the manner of a trade-mark
or trade name" standard was more flexible than the definition
of trademark use traditionally applied in the technical trade-
mark context, which listed specific, concrete forms of mark
application-placement on the product itself, on its receptacle,
label, or packaging, on signs or prints associated with the
product, or in product advertising.74  All of technical trade-
it sensible to stress a defendant's "affixation" in technical trademark infringement
suits, to ensure that the presumptions of fraudulent intent and consumer confusion
could be justified, such precautions were not as essential in the larger, unfair compe-
tition context because no such presumption existed. Plaintiffs bore the burden of
demonstrating the defendant's fraudulent intent and the likelihood of consumer
confusion. See Barrett, supra note 4, at 918-20. Indeed, technical trademark owners
who could not demonstrate that a defendant "affixed" the mark to its merchandise as
strictly defined in the early common law and the Trademark Act of 1871, could sue
instead for unfair competition, if they were able to make the requisite showing of
fraudulent intent and use for secondary meaning.
7 For a discussion of why this is so, see Barrett, supra note 4, at 922-28.
7 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra note 20, at § 717.
" Section 727 provided:
One uses a designation in the manner of a trade-mark or trade name,
under the rule stated in § 717, if he so uses it that prospective purchasers
are likely to regard it as the name of, or the means of identifying [the
user's] goods, services or business.
Id. at § 727.
7 See supra notes 66-70, and accompanying text.
[Vol. 28:1
HeinOnline  -- 28 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 22 2010-2011
2010] RECONCILING FAIR USE AND TRADEMARK USE
mark law's enumerated forms of mark placement could be eas-
ily and objectively verified, and served as an efficient proxy, to
indicate that the use was likely to indicate source to consum-
ers. In contrast, the Restatement of Torts' definition of use "in
the manner of a trade-mark or trade name" contemplated a
fact-intensive, case-by-case determination of likely consumer
perceptions.75
The Restatement's approach accommodated claims for
service mark and business name infringement; given the diffi-
culty of "affixing" a mark to an intangible, the more concrete
standard of technical trademark law (which only contemplated
marks to identify product source) may have appeared inade-
quate to address the broader array of unfair competition
75
claims. However, the Restatement "use in the manner of a
trademark or trade name" standard also contemplated that af-
fixation or close association might be insufficient, in itself, to
indicate consumer reliance for source. Rather, the Restate-
ment suggested that, instead of relying on "affixation or other
close association" as a proxy for consumer understanding,
courts should always undertake a fact-intensive determination
of likely consumer understanding under the specific circum-
77
stances of each case.
The Restatement apparently also intended for its all-
purpose "use in the manner of a trademark or trade name"
standard to replace the unfair competition law's "use for sec-
ondary meaning" requirement. There was no other Restate-
ment provision that purported to address that common-law
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, supra, note 20, at § 727, cmt. a:
The right of a person having a trade-mark or trade name is not to the ex-
clusive use of the designation in all circumstances, but only to its exclusive
use for the performance of the functions of a trademark, subject to the
conditions stated in § 717(1)(b). Other persons may use the designation if
their use does not involve a performance of those functions.... Legally,
the fundamental function of a trade-mark or trade name is to denominate
or identify the goods, services or business of a single trader. . . . In deter-
mining whether or not the actor's use of a designation involves the per-
formance of that function and thus infringes another's trade-mark or trade
name, it is the impression likely to be conveyed to prospective purchasers . .
. that is important.
See also id., at cmt. b:
One uses a designation in the manner of a trade-mark or trade name ... ,
whether he affixes the designation to goods or otherwise uses it in such a
way as to convey the impression to prospective purchasers that it identifies
his goods, services or business. This impression he may give by using the
designation in various ways, such as in his advertising or his signs or letter-
heads, or in his correspondence or speech....
7 The drafters of the Lanham Act later provided different definitions of "use in
commerce" for trademarks and service marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2009).
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 727, cmt. a (1938).
23
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limitation, and various statements in the accompanying com-
ments made it clear that the Restatement drafters intended to
blend the unfair competition "use for secondary (trademark)
meaning" limitation into the initial "use in the manner of a
trade-mark or trade name" determination. However, in its
desire to unify and simplify the technical trademark and unfair
competition causes of action, the Restatement drafters over-
looked an important common-law objective. In focusing the
Restatement's "use in the manner of a trademark or trade
name" requirement on likely consumer perceptions, the Re-
statement adhered to the underlying purpose of the trademark
use ("affixation or other close association") requirement.
However, it did not effectively adhere to the purpose or con-
form to the established focus of the unfair competition "use for
secondary meaning" requirement. As will be discussed in
1 79
greater depth infra, courts determining the "use for secon-
dary meaning" issue focused on the defendant's purpose in apply-
ing the mark, rather than on the application's likely impact on
consumers. Focusing on the defendant's apparent purpose, as
opposed to the likely impact of the use on consumers, pro-
vided significantly greater latitude for competitors to use de-
scriptive and surname words and symbols.
While the Restatement of Torts undertook to combine
the "affixation or other close association" requirement and the
"use for secondary (trademark) meaning" requirement into a
single standard, the subsequent Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition reverted to distinguishing "trademark use" and
"use for secondary meaning" as separate elements of the in-
fringement cause of action. o Moreover, the federal statutory
7 Restatement § 740 specified that "the fact that the designation which the actor uses
is his own personal name or the name of the place where the goods which he mar-
kets are processed or is descriptive of such goods does not in itself constitute a de-
fense to a charge of infringement." Id. at § 740, n.20. Rather, the descriptive, sur-
name or geographically descriptive status of the contested word or symbol would be
relevant (though not decisive) in determining whether the defendant's use was "de-
nominative," or constituted use "in the manner of a trade-mark or trade name," as
required under Restatement section 717. Id., cmt. a. In defining use "in the manner
of a trade-mark or trade name," Restatement § 727 incorporated factors (such as the
arrangement of words, and variations in the size of the letters used) that had tradi-
tionally been associated with the common-law unfair competition "use for pri-
mary/secondary meaning" inquiry. Id, § 727, cmt a.
See infra Parts III and IV.
8 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition states the "trademark use" re-
quirement in § 20:
One is subject to liability for infringement of another's trademark, trade
name, collective mark, or certification mark if the other's use has priority
under the rules stated in § 19 and in identifying the actor's business or in mar-
keting the actor's goods or services the actor uses a designation that causes a like-
lihood of confusion ...
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law never undertook to combine them. Indeed, the Supreme
Court clearly differentiated those requirements in the context
of secondary meaning marks that were federally registered
pursuant to the Trademark Act of 1905's "10-year clause."'
82
In Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids, the Supreme Court
held that the 1905 Act's statutory elements for registered mark
infringement (which restated the elements of the common-law
cause of action for technical trademark infringement) would gov-
ern all claims of registered mark infringement, regardless of
whether the allegedly infringed registered mark was a techni-
cal trademark or a secondary meaning mark. Thus, to prevail
in an infringement claim, the owner of a registered secondary
meaning mark would have to demonstrate all of the Act's
statutory infringement elements, including the requirement
that the defendant affixed or closely associated its mark with
its product.3 However, the Supreme Court clearly distin-
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 (1995) (emphasis added). Sec-
tion 28 follows the Lanham Act in stating the common-law "use for secondary mean-
ing" requirement as a "fair use" defense:
In an action for infringement . .. it is a defense that the term used by the
actor is descriptive or geographically descriptive of the actor's goods,
services, or business, or is the personal name of the actor or a person con-
nected with the actor, and the actor has used the term fairly and in good
faith solely to describe the actor's goods, services, or business, or to indicate
a connection with the named person.
Id. at § 28.
" Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 5, 33 Stat. 724. Federal registration had previ-
ously been limited to technical trademarks, but the "ten-year clause" of the 1905 Act
permitted secondary meaning marks to be registered if they had been used exclu-
sively for a period of ten years immediately preceding 1905. The apparent reasoning
was that marks that were not inherently distinctive, but had been in exclusive use for
ten or more years, could be presumed to have acquired secondary meaning and thus
could be equated to technical trademarks in function and interest. See CALLMANN,
supra note 23 at § 98.7; 2 NIMS, supra note 27, at § 229(a), p 790; Handler & Pickett
II, supra note 48, at 783-84.
This measure was further liberalized in the Trade-Mark Act of 1920, ch. 104, § 4, 41
Stat. 533, and was the precursor of Lanham Act § 2(e) and (f), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) &
(f), which provided even more liberally for the registration of descriptive, geographi-
cally descriptive and surname marks that had become distinctive through acquisition
of secondary meaning.
8 233 U.S. 461 (1914).
a Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 724. § 16 imposed liability on:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the owner thereof,
reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably imitate any such trademark and
affix the same to merchandise of substantially the same descriptive
properties as those set forth in the registration, or to labels, signs, prints,
packages, wrappers, or receptacles intended to be used upon or in
connection with the sale of merchandise of substantially the same
descriptive properties as those set forth in such registration, and shall use,
or shall have used, such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation in commerce among the several states, or with a foreign nation,
or with the Indian tribes....
Id. (emphasis added). See also Trade-Mark Act of 1920, ch. 104, § 4, 41 Stat. 533
(similar language).
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guished the plaintiffs burden to prove the statutory "trade-
mark use" element from the issue of whether the defendant
had used the registered word or symbol for a "secondary"
(trademark) meaning or for its "primary" descriptive or sur-
name meaning. The Court characterized the "use for secon-
dary (trademark) meaning" requirement as an additional, extra-
statutory limitation on the rights of secondary meaning mark
84
registrants.
As will be discussed below, Congress followed a similar
pattern in enacting the Lanham Act: it required all federal in-
fringement claimants to demonstrate that the defendant af-
fixed or closely associated its mark to its product (as had been
required in technical trademark law and the Trademark Act of
1905) and imposed a separate statutory "secondary rather than
primary meaning" limitation on federal infringement claims
involving descriptive, geographically descriptive or surname
86
marks. Unlike the Restatement of Torts, the Lanham Act did
not undertake to consolidate these two "use-related" require-
ments or state a unified standard for evaluating them both.
C. Consolidation of Technical Trademark Infringement and Unfair
Competition in the Lanham Act
As the United States developed a more expansive and
sophisticated marketplace, pressure grew to modernize and
expand federal trademark protection. By the late 1930s the
Trademark Act of 1905 had been frequently amended, result-
87
ing in a confusing array of statutory provisions. Commenta-
tors argued that common-law distinctions between technical
trademarks and secondary meaning marks were artificial and
outdated, and they particularly questioned the wisdom of re-
quiring plaintiffs to demonstrate fraud in secondary meaning
88
mark infringement cases. Practitioners argued that registra-
tion opportunities should be provided for service marks, and
that the limited opportunities to register secondary meaning
marks under the Trademark Acts of 1905 and 1920 should be
84Thaddeus Davids, 233 U.S. at 469-71 (emphasis added).
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) (a),1125(a) (2006).
"415 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4) (2006).
87 See I MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 5:3 (enumerating drawbacks and deficiencies in
the 1905 Act that lead to a series of amendments over the years, eventually resulting
in a "crazy quilt of modifications and amendments"); 2 NIMS, supra note 27, § 223a
_(describing ten amendments to the 1905 Act).
E.g., 2 CALLMANN, supra note 23, §§ 86.1(a), 98.6, 98.7; 1 NIMS, supra note 27, §
135, at 513; Grismore, supra note 50 passim- Handler & Pickett I, supra note 41 passim-
Handler & Pickett II, supra note 48 passim.
[Vol. 28:1
HeinOnline  -- 28 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 26 2010-2011
2010] RECONCILING FAIR USE AND TRADEMARK USE
liberalized. In addition, they complained that language in the
1905 and 1920 Acts' infringement provisions that limited relief
to cases where the defendant used the mark for "merchandise
of substantially the same descriptive properties" as the mer-
chandise set forth in the plaintiffs registration certificate was
unnecessarily vague, unpredictable, and limiting."
In 1938, Congress began seriously to focus on drafting a
new, more modern and comprehensive federal trademark
act.90 It completed the task in 1946, and the resulting act
(called the "Lanham Act" in honor of the Congressman pri-
marily credited with its drafting and enactment) went into ef-
fect in 1947." The legislative history states that the Act was
meant to "simplify registration and make it stronger and more
liberal, to dispense with mere technical prohibitions and arbi-
trary provisions, to make procedure simple, and relief against
infringement prompt and simple." However, it is generally
understood that Congress primarily codified contemporary
common-law doctrine, just as it had in prior federal trade-
mark acts.94 Moreover, it retained much of the structure and
" These Acts required that infringement defendants use the contested mark with
"merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties" as the merchandise set
forth in the plaintiffs registration certificate. See Trade-Mark Act of 1881, ch. 138,
§ 7, 21 Stat. 502; Trade-Mark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 724; Trade-Mark Act
of 1920, ch. 104, § 4, 41 Stat. 533. Complaints focused on the vagueness and uncer-
tainty of that statutory language, and the resulting inconsistency in the case law re-
garding how similar the defendant's products had to be to the plaintiffs before in-
fringement could be found. Critics also argued that limiting infringement to cases
where the parties marketed similar goods was too narrow. See Bartholomew, supra
note 66, at 11. For further examples of criticisms, see Edward C. Lukens, The Applica-
tion of the Principles of Unfair Competition to Cases of Dissimilar Products, 75 U. PA. L. REV.
197, 202-205 (1927); Edward S. Rogers, Some Suggestions Concerning a Trade-Mark Regis-
tration Act, 16 U.S.T.A. BuLL. 45, 50-51 (1921); Edward S. Rogers, The Expensive Futility
0of the United States' Trade-Mark Statute, 12 MICH. L. REv. 660, 668-71 (1914).For discussion of the early beginnings of the Lanham Act, see 1 MCCARTHY, supra
note 21, at § 5:4; Keith M. Stolte, A Response to jerome Gilson's Call for an Overhaul of the
Lanham Act, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1335, 1347-50 (2004).
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2006).
2 S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946).
9 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 861 n.2 (1982) (White, J., con-
curring) ("The purpose of the Lanham Act was to codify and unify the common law
of unfair competition and trademark protection"); S. Rep. No. 79-1333, at 5 (1946);
92 CONG. REC. 6, 7524 (1946). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 9, cmt. e (1995) ("The Lanham Act is generally declarative of exist-
ing law, incorporating the principal features of common law trademark protection");
Leval, supra note 42, at 198-99 (Lanham Act "adopts and stands for the complete
common law development, representing a complexity of doctrine which would re-
quire dozens of pages to set forth in full. .. . What may look on its face like a legisla-
tive creation of a body of rules is in fact nothing more than a cursory legislative rec-
ognition of a long pre-existing body of law developed by courts through the common
law process."); McClure, supra note 29, at 334, 340 (Lanham Act adopted the sub-
stance of existing common-law doctrine and court constructions have not altered it).
"The earlier acts codified the common-law trademark rights of mark registrants,
providing procedural, but no substantive advantages over the common law. Wal-
green Drug Stores, Inc. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 113 F.2d 956, 960 (8th Cir. 1940);
27
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terminology of the earlier federal trademark acts in the new
95one.
The Lanham Act did introduce some new concepts,9 6
and both modernized and liberalized features of the earlier
trademark acts.97 For purposes of the present discussion, the
Lanham Act did three important things. First, the Lanham
Act liberalized registration of secondary meaning marks.
Lanham Act § 2 provides that words, names, symbols, or de-
vices that are merely descriptive, primarily geographically de-
scriptive, or constitute surnames can be registered upon a
showing that they have "become distinctive" of the applicant's
goods or services (that is, have acquired a secondary mean-
ing). It authorizes the Patent and Trademark Office to accept
proof of "substantially exclusive and continuous use of the
Callmann Article, supra, note 42, at 202. Prior to enactment of the Lanham Act, it
was widely believed that Congress lacked jurisdiction, even under the Commerce
Clause, to provide substantive rights in trademarks. See, e.g., American Steel Foun-
dries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 381 (1926) (suggesting that Congress "has been
given no power to legislate upon the substantive law of trade-marks."); Liddy, Has
Congress the Constitutional Power to Legislate on the Substantive Law of Trademarks?, 6
FORDHAM. L. REv. 408 (1937) (noting American Steel authority, but disagreeing with
it).
However, that assertion had been criticized. Philco Corp. v. Phillips Mfg. Co.,
133 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1943); 2 CALLMANN, supra, note 23, at § 97.2. Congress, in
enacting the Lanham Act, determined that it did possess the necessary power. S.
REP. No. 79-1333, at 5-6 (1946) ("There can be no doubt under the recent decisions
of the Supreme Court of the constitutionality of a national act giving substantive, as
distinguished from purely procedural rights in trade-marks in commerce over which
Congress has plenary power. . . .").
9
5 Judge Clarence G. Galston, Some Aspects of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act-Effective July 5,
37 TRADEMARK REP. 412, 413 (1947) (characterizing the Lanham Act as codifying the
Trademark Act of 1905 and its numerous amendments). See also Barrett, supra note 4
at 933-57. Indeed, some commentators criticized the Lanham Act as merely codify-
ing entrenched formalist doctrine. See, e.g., McClure, supra note 29, at 334, 340 (not-
ing that "[t]he effect of the Lanham Act was essentially to freeze common-law doc-
trine in the form it had taken since the turn of the century" and characterizing it not
as progressive reform but as "essentially reactionary.").
Many features of the Lanham Act can be traced back to the earlier federal
trademark acts. For example, the Trademark Act of 1905 provided that registration
created a presumption of mark ownership, and permitted registration for secondary
meaning marks. Trademark Act of 1905, §§ 5, 16, 33 Stat. 724, 726, 728. Forerun-
ners of the Lanham Act's Supplemental Register and "false designations of origin"
provision (in Lanham Act §43(a)) can be found in the Trademark Act of 1920.
Trademark Act of 1920, §§ 1, 3, 41 Stat. 533, 534.
9 For example, it introduced the doctrine of constructive notice, which enabled
mark registrants to enhance the geographic scope of their rights, 15 U.S.C. § 1072
(2009), and incontestability status to shelter mark registrants from certain challenges
and defenses after five years of registration. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115 (2009). It offi-
cially recognized and provided registration and protection for service marks, collec-
tive marks and certification marks. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1053, 1054 (1999).
9 For example, as commentators had advocated, Congress liberalized the earlier acts'
restriction of infringement to "merchandise of substantially the same descriptive
properties" as those set forth in the plaintiffs certificate of registration. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1)(a). Moreover, the Lanham Act's definition of a "trademark" and descrip-
tion of the marks eligible for registration, 15 U.S.C. § §1052, 1127, paved the way for
businesses to claim and register a broader range of symbols and devices than would
have been deemed marks under the common law. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
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mark" for five years as prima facie evidence of secondary mean-
. 98
mng.
Second, the Lanham Act continued the practice (that
began in the 1905 Act) of applying a uniform infringement
standard that did not distinguish between technical (or inher-
ently distinctive) registered marks and secondary meaning reg-
istered marks." It also provided a federal cause of action for
infringement of unregistered marks, which courts ultimately
construed to prescribe the same eligibility and infringement
standards as did the registered mark provisions.100 This uni-
form infringement standard required that infringement de-
fendants "use in commerce' a reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation of a mark "in connection with" the sale, of-
fering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or ser-
" 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) & (f) (2006). The Lanham Act defines "trademarks" broadly,
to include "any word, name, symbol or device or any combination thereof" used "to
identify and distinguish [the claimant's] goods . . . from those manufactured or sold
by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown."
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). Thus, the Lanham Act denominates both kinds of com-
mon-law marks-technical marks and secondary meaning marks (aka "trade names")-
as "trademarks." It provides that "trademarks" can be registered unless they are spe-
cifically disqualified under one of the provisions of Lanham Act § 2. 15 U.S.C. § 1052
(2006). While § 2(e) disqualifies surname, descriptive, and geographically descrip-
tive marks, subsection (f) provides that "nothing ... shall prevent the registration of
a mark used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant's goods
in commerce." Id. § 1052(f).
* See supra notes 83-86, and accompanying text.
10 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
As originally enacted, the pertinent portion of §43(a) provided:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designa-
tion of origin, or any false description or representation, including words
or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and
shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce . . . shall be liable
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1946) (emphasis added). A similarly worded provision existed
under the Trademark Act of 1920, but unlike the cause of action for registered mark
infringement, it required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the defendant acted with
fraudulent intent. Trade-Mark Act of 1920, § 3, 41 Stat 533, 534. Revisions enacted
in 1988 reworded the Lanham Act § 43(a) language to provide:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any con-
tainer for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or mis-
leading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact,
which * * * is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable ....
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, PUB. L. No. 100-667, § 132, 102 Stat. 3946
(emphasis added). The Senate Report explained that the revision was meant to codify
the couts'interpretation of § 43(a). As written, § 43(a) appeared "to deal only with false
descriptions or representations and false designations of geographic origin." Since its
enactment in 1946, however, § 43(a) had "been widely interpreted as creating, in es-
sence, a federal law of unfair competition." S. REP. No. 100-515, at 38 (1988) (em-
phasis added).
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vices. 0'o It defined "use in commerce" essentially to entail af-
fixation or other close association of the mark with the defen-
dant's goods or services (or a "trademark use"), as was re-
quired in the common-law cause of action for technical
trademark infringement and in the Trademark Acts of 1905
and 1920.02 Like the Trademark Act of 1905 (as construed by
the Supreme Court in Thaddeus Davids), the Lanham Act in-
fringement provisions imposed no requirement that the plain-
tiff demonstrate the defendant's fraudulent intent, regardless
of whether the mark at issue was inherently distinctive or dis-
tinctive through secondary meaning.
Finally, the Lanham Act codified the unfair competition
law's longstanding distinction between a defendant's use of a
1o1 Lanham Act § 32(1) (a), which provides for infringement of registered marks, pro-
vides:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive . .. shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1115(1) (a). Lanham Act § 43(a), which provides a cause of action for
infringement of unregistered marks, currently provides:
(1) Any person who, on or n connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin ...
which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person,
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person ...
Shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is
or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2009).
102 See supra notes 64-70, and accompanying notes. Lanham Act § 45 states that the
definitions it provides should be applied in construing the Lanham Act "unless the
contrary is plainly apparent from the context." 15 U.S.C. § 1127. It provides that a
mark
... shall be deemed to be in use in commerce-
(1) on goods when-
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the dis-
plays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the
nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on docu-
ments associated with the goods or their sale, and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising or ser-
vices and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are ren-
dered in more than one State or in the United States and a foreign country
and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connec-
tion with the services.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2009). This provision describes "affixation or other close associa-
tion," or "trademark use," as traditionally understood in the context of technical
trademark infringement, and also ensures Congressional authority to regulate the
use under the Constitution's Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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word or symbol for a secondary (trademark) meaning, and its
use of a word or symbol for its primary (descriptive, geo-
graphically descriptive, or surname) meaning. In keeping with
the common law of unfair competition, the Lanham Act lim-
ited liability for infringement of descriptive, geographically de-
scriptive, and surname marks to a defendant's use for secon-
dary (trademark) meaning. However, the Lanham Act
imposed that limitation in the form of a defense, codified in §
33(b) (4) ,o rather than as a part of the plaintiffs case in chief.
Under § 33(b) (4), a defendant will not be liable for infringe-
ment if its use of the allegedly infringing word or symbol was a
use "otherwise than as a mark, of [his] individual name in his
own business ... or of a term or device which is descriptive of
and used fairly and in good faith only to describe [his] goods
,,104or services, or their geographic origin.
1. The Lanham Act's Codification of the "Trademark Use"
("Affixation or other Close Association") Prerequisite to
Infringement Liability
The legislative history makes it clear that Congress in-
tended for the Lanham Act infringement provisions to retain
the "trademark use" requirement from the common law of
technical trademark infringement, which it had codified ear-
lier in the Trademark Act of 1905." That is, Congress in-
tended to require infringement plaintiffs to demonstrate that
the defendant affixed or closely associated the allegedly in-
fringing word or symbol to the goods or services it was mar-
keting. First, Congress made it clear that it generally in-
tended the Lanham Act to codify contemporary common-law
10 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4) (2009).
104 Id.
105 Barrett, supra notes 4 at 932 n. 141, 943-64.
10 It is important to note that Congress explicitly extended registration and protec-
tion to marks used to identify the source of the user's services. However, for the sake
of brevity, in the remaining sections of this article I will refer to marks in connection
with "goods" or "products" and ask the reader to understand the discussion to in-
clude use of marks in connection with "services," as well.
"o' C.f Bartholomew Diggins, The Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 37 TRADEMARK REP. 419,
436 (1947) (characterizing the Lanham Act § 32(1) (a) infringement provisions as
continuing the 1905 Act "affixation" requirement, but improving on it: "Under the
1905 Act, affixation of the infringing mark was an essential element of infringement
but Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act defines infringement in terms broad enough to
include sales and resale of goods or services bearing the infringing mark even
though such infringing mark was affixed by some other infringer. Section 32(1) spe-
cifically includes the use of an infringing mark in advertising apart from the goods
themselves and thus remedies another deficiency of the prior trade-mark legisla-
tion.").
31
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doctrine.'0s While Congress augmented and altered the com-
mon law in some aspects, it typically did so in response to criti-
cisms and suggestions made by interested parties and com-
mentators, or (as in the case of the constructive notice and
incontestability provisions) to provide inducements to regis-
ter.'09 There was no expressed dissatisfaction or call to reform
the "trademark use" ("affixation or other close association")
prerequisite to infringement liability.o Commentators have
uniformly understood that the Lanham Act essentially codified
the existing common-law technical trademark and 1905 Act
rules governing infringement."'
Second, Congress expressly drafted the Lanham Act in-
fringement provisions to require that defendants "use [their
allegedly infringing word or symbol] in commerce."" In
Lanham Act § 45, Congress defined "use in commerce" to en-
tail essentially two things: 1) affixation or close, direct associa-
tion of a word or symbol with goods or services being mar-
keted; and 2) a link to Interstate Commerce sufficient to
provide Congressional power to regulate the subject matter.
The § 45 definition of "use in commerce" is highly reminiscent
of the "affixation or other close association" language of the
Trademark Act of 1905, § 16, and can be readily understood to
require that the defendant's mark be used as a trademark to
identify the source of the defendant's goods or services. Both
the opening language of § 45114 and the Lanham Act's exten-
sive legislative history make it clear that Congress intended for
this definition to apply in the infringement context and limit the
scope of mark owners' rights. Indeed, a number of courts
have cited the § 45 definition of "use in commerce" as author-
108 Barrett, supra note 4, at 932 n.141, 960-64, and sources cited therein.
1 With regard to the elements of infringement, commentators only advocated
changing the 1905 Act requirement that the defendant's goods constitute "mer-
chandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as those set forth" in the
plaintiffs registration certificate. See supra note 90, and accompanying text; Trade-
mark Act of 1905, § 16.
"0 Barrett, supra note 4, at 939, and sources cited therein.
See supra notes 94, 96, 98.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1) (a) (2005), 1125(a) (2009) (emphasis added).
us 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2009). For the statutory language, see supra note 103.
See supra note 103; Barrett, supra note 4, at 946-56.
Id. As explained more fully in the cited article: 1) this construction is most consis-
tent with the infringement provisions in prior Federal Trademark Acts, and there is
no suggestion that Congress intended to change their substance; 2) statements made
in hearings on the bills suggest that participants linked the § 45 "use in commerce"
definition with the infringement provisions; and perhaps most importantly; 3) dur-
ing the course of enactment, the § 45 definition was repeatedly revised to track changes
in the § 32 infringement language from one bill to the next, clearly indicating that the
drafters primarily envisioned the § 45 definition as working in conjunction with the
infiingement provisions, rather than with the provisions regarding acquisition of rights
or eligibility to register.
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ity for requiring infringement plaintiffs to demonstrate a form
of "trademark use" on the defendant's part."6
Finally, even if the § 45 definition of "use in commerce"
were not applicable in the infringement context, Congress ex-
pressly required, in both its registered and unregistered mark
infringement provisions, that the defendant use its alleged1
infringing mark "on or in connection with" goods or services.
As I have explained elsewhere, this language is historically
linked to the "affixation or other close association" concept,
and is essentially synonymous with "trademark use," as tradi-
tionally required under the common law of technical trade-
mark infringement and the Trademark Act of 1905." Even
apart from historical context, this language stresses the connec-
tion between the allegedly infringing word or symbol and the
goods or services the defendant is marketing, much like the
terms "affix" and "apply," which Congress used more or less in-
terchangeably with the "on or in connection with" language
during the course of drafting the Lanham Act infringement
and definition sections.'19 Again, a significant number of
courts have looked to this language to find a form of trade-
mark use requirement.'20
"6 See e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 406 - 407 (2d Cir.
2005); Daimlerchrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 936 (8th Cir. 2003); Acad. of Mo-
tion Picture Arts & Sci. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276, 1279 (C.D. Cal.
1997); Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 934 (D.D.C. 1985); Nat'l
Tuberculosis Ass'n. v. Summit County Tuberculosis Health Ass'n, 122 F. Supp. 654,
656-57 (N.D. Ohio 1954); Wells Fargo & Co. v. When-U.Com, 293 F. Supp. 2d 734,
757 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Euromarket Designs, Inc. v. Crate & Barrel Ltd., 96 F. Supp.
2d 824, 830-33 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Macia v. Microsoft Corp., 152 F. Supp. 2d 535, 539
(D. Vt. 2001); WHS Entm't Ventures v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 997 F.
Supp. 946,946-50 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc. v. Bai-
ley & Assocs., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1212-13 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
In Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 131-41 (2d Cir. 2009), the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit revisited the question of whether Congress in-
tended the § 45 definition to apply in the infringement context. It ultimately found
that § 45 applied, although its discussion of the legislative history overlooked impor-
tant elements, and its application of the definition to the factors at hand was uncon-
vincing.
"' 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a) (2005), 1125(a) (2009) (emphasis added).
11s See supra Barrett, note 4, at 955-60.
"' Id.
" E.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 676-80 (9th Cir. 2005); N. Am.
Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1218-20 & n.7 (11th Cir. 2008);
Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d
1045,1052-54 (10th Cir. 2008).
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2. Codification of the Unfair Competition "Use for
Secondary (Trademark) Meaning" Limitation
While Congress codified the "trademark use" require-
ment in Lanham Act §§ 32(1) (a) and 45, it codified the unfair
competition "use for secondary meaning" limitation in
Lanham Act § 1115(b) (4), which is now generally known as
the "fair use defense.', 2 1 As codified, the fair use defense shel-
ters an infringement defendant when his use of an allegedly
infringing mark
is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual
name in his own business, or of the individual name of
anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device
which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith
only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their
.. 122geographic origin.
Consistent with the Supreme Court's reasoning in the
Davids case, 1 the fair use defense recognizes that even when
secondary meaning marks are registered, they are entitled to a
narrower scope of protection than inherently distinctive
marks, because of their pre-existing descriptive or surname
meaning, and the long-established public interest in ensuring
competitor access to words and symbols that describe their
goods, their goods' geographic origin, or constitute their sur-
124name.
1' There is general agreement that Congress intended to, and did, codify the com-
mon-law "use for secondary meaning, rather than primary meaning" limitation in the
fair use defense. E.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543
U.S. 111, 122 (2004); Venetianaire Corp. of Am. v. A & P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079,
1081 (2d Cir. 1970); M.B.H. Enter., Inc. v. WOKY, Inc., 633 F.2d 50, 52 n.2 (7th Cir.
1980); 4 McCarthy, supra note 21, at § 11:49 at 11-117; 2 CALLMANN, supra note 23, at
85.1(b), pp 1357-58; Leval, supra note 42, at 198-99.
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4) (2009).
123 See supra notes 83-85, and accompanying text.
124 See KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 122 (The common law afforded lesser protection for
secondary meaning marks due to "the very fact that ... a originally descriptive term
was selected to be used as a mark" and "the undesirability of allowing anyone to ob-
tain a complete monopoly on use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it first."
Lanham Act § 1115(b) (4) "adopts a similar leniency, there being no indication that
the statute was meant to deprive commercial speakers of the ordinary utility of de-
scriptive words."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra
note 42, § 28 cmt. a; Hearings on H.R. 102 before the Subcommittee on Trademarks
of the House Committee on Patents, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., at 72 (1941) (Testimony
of Wallace Martin, Chairman of ABA Committee on Trademark Legislation).
As discussed supra at notes 83-85, courts continued to apply the pri-
mary/secondary meaning distinction in infringement cases involving secondary
meaning marks registered under the Trademark Act of 1905, even though the 1905
Act did not expressly incorporate it. Congress found it necessary to codify the pri-
mary/secondary meaning distinction in the Lanham Act because of the Lanham
Act's institution of "incontestability status" for marks that have been registered for
[Vol. 28:1
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Several attempts were made during the course of draft-
ing the Lanham Act to restrict the fair use doctrine-by confin-
ing it to situations in which the defendant used a generic word
or symbol, 2 5 by confining it to situations in which the defen-
dant's use was not likely to deceive the public, and by confining it
to situations in which the defendant's use was "necessary" truth-
126
fully to describe its goods or services. Congress rejected all
of these narrowing formulations in favor of the existing, more
expansive common-law scope of the "use for secondary
(trademark) meaning" limitation: A defendant only in-
fringes a secondary meaning mark if she uses it for a trade-
over five years. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064, 1065, 1115 (2009). Under the incontestability
provisions, a mark that has obtained incontestability status is immune from all chal-
lenges and defenses except for those expressly reserved in sections 1064, 1065, and
1115(b). Congress codified the primary/secondary meaning doctrine, as the §
1115(b)(4) "fair use" defense, to ensure that the doctrine remained applicable to all
secondary meaning marks, regardless of incontestability status. Even though the de-
fense is codified in the § 1115 "incontestability" provisions, courts and commentators
have made it clear that it applies in all infringement cases, whether the mark is in-
contestable or not, and whether the mark is registered or not. E.g. Venetianaire Corp.,
429 F.2d at 1081 (2d Cir. 1970); M.B.H. Enter., 633 F.2d at 52 n.2; McCarthy, supra
note 21, at § 11:49 at 11-117; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra
note 42, § 28, cmt. a.
125 See H.R. 6618, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., § 32(2) (1939) (proposed language would
provide a defense when "the use by the defendant of the mark charged to be an in-
fringement is a fair use of the defendant's individual name in his own business in a
manner not calculated to deceive the public, or is a fair use of the only known descrip-
tive term for goods rightfully sold by the defendant") (emphasis added).
"' See H.R. 5461, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., § 33(b) (4) (1941) (proposed language would
provide a defense when "the use by the defendant of the term or device charged to
be an infringement is not a use as a trade or service mark and in a manner not likely to
deceive the public, of the defendant's individual name in his own business, or of the
individual name of anyone in privity with the defendant who uses his own name in
his own business, or of a term or device which is merely descriptive of and necessary
truthfully to describe to users the goods or services of the defendant, or of a term or
device which is primarily descriptive of their geographic origin . . . .") (emphasis
added). These restrictions had significant support from prominent trademark law-
yers. See, e.g., Nims, supra note 27, at § 366g, pp. 1153-54; Handler & Pickett I, supra
note 41, at 184.
12 See H.R. 82, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. § 33(b) (4) (1943) (providing defense when "the
use by the defendant of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a
use, otherwise than as a trade or service mark, of the defendant's individual name in
his own business, or of the individual name of any one in privity with the defendant,
or of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to
describe to users the goods or services of the defendant, or their geographic origin");
H.R. 1654, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. § 33(b) (4) (1945) (providing defense when "the use
of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use, otherwise than
as a trade or service mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of
the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which
is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe to users the goods
or services of such party, or their geographic origin").
The committee hearings make it clear that the drafters intended to codify the
existing common-law scope of the primary/secondary meaning limitation. See, e.g.,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Trade-Marks, Committee on Patents on
H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., at 63-74 (debate among
witnesses about the scope of the existing common-law rule, in which Mr. Martin, rep-
resenting the ABA, assures the Committee that the common-law does not limit pro-
tection of defendants using words in the primary sense to situations in which their
use is "necessary.").
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mark (secondary) meaning, rather than for its primary de-
scriptive or surname meaning. A use for the word or symbol's
primary descriptive or surname meaning will not infringe, re-
gardless of whether it was strictly necessary for the defendant
to use that particular word or symbol, or whether the use may
128
confuse consumers.
The codification does, however, represent some altera-
tion (or perhaps evolution) of the original common-law unfair
competition doctrine. First, Lanham Act § 33(b) (4) shifts the
burden of proof regarding whether the defendant used the
word or symbol for a primary or secondary (trademark) mean-
ing. Under the common law of unfair competition, the unfair
competition plaintiff had the burden to demonstrate that the
defendant had used the contested word or symbol for a secon-
dary, or trademark, meaning.2 9  Under the Lanham Act, the
defendant must demonstrate that its use was "otherwise than as
a mark,",' "only to describe the goods or services of such party,
or their geographic origin." The Lanham Act language clearly
codifies the common-law unfair competition understanding
that marketplace actors may use surname or descriptive words
or symbols in their primary descriptive sense, but not in a
trademark (or secondary meaning) sense. However, casting
the "use for secondary meaning" limitation as a defense clearly
moves the burden to the defendant.13 '
Second, the Lanham Act relieved plaintiffs of the un-
1 See infra Part III B.
'2 2 NIMS, supra note 27, at § 336, pp. 1057-58 ("In actions based on defendant's use
of a descriptive word . . . which, in a secondary sense, indicates plaintiffs business or
product, the burden is on the plaintiff to show such secondary meaning, also that
defendant is using [the word] in [its] secondary, not [its] primary sense); Kellogg
Toasted Corn Flake Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 235 F. 657, 664 (6th Cir. 1916); DixiePig
Corp. v. Pig Stand Co., 31 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); De Long Hook &
Eje Co. v. Hump Hairpin Mfg. Co., 130 N.E. 765 (Ill. Supreme Ct. 1921).
Otherwise than as a mark" is equivalent to "use for primary (as opposed to secon-
dary) meaning." See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 42,
at § 28, cmt. a ("The defense of fair use under the law of trademarks is limited to use
of the original descriptive or personal name significance of a term. This limitation of
the scope of the fair use doctrine is sometimes described by stating that the doctrine
applies only to use 'otherwise than as a trademark,' or only to 'non-trademark use' of
another's mark.").
.. One contemporary commentator suggested that the common law of unfair com-
petition moved the burden of proof to the defendant prior to the enactment of the
Lanham Act. See 2 NIMS, supra note 23, at § 336, pp. 1057-58; CALLMANN, supra note
42, at 196. However, he did not cite convincing authority for this proposition. The
law of technical trademarks held that once the owner of a technical trademark made a
prima facie showing of infringement, the burden shifted to the defendant to justify
his use. 2 NIMS, supra note 27, § 336, p. 1057; Standard Oil Co. v. Cal. Peach & Fig
Growers, 28 F.2d 283, 285-86 (D. Del. 1928); Centaur Co. v. Genesh, 33 F.2d 985,
986 (W.D. Pa. 1929). It also appears that the defendant bore the burden of proving
that its use was a proper nominative use of the mark to identify the plaintiff. See, e.g.,
Vick Chemical Co. v. Strohmeier, 39 F.2d 89, 91 (E.D. Pa. 1930).
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popular burden of affirmatively demonstrating the defendant's
fraudulent intent in secondary meaning mark infringement
cases. However, it did not dismiss consideration of the plain-
tiff's state of mind altogether. Rather, it required the defen-
dant to demonstrate that it acted "in good faith,"m or with a
lack of fraudulent intent."
The Lanham Act combines the issues of use for pri-
mary/secondary meaning and the defendant's intent into a
single "fair use" determination, but this fusing of the two issues
actually reflects the general practice at common law. As I will
explain in the next section, by the time the Lanham Act was
enacted, the courts had essentially woven these two issues into
a unified concept: assuming that the defendant's actions con-
stituted the requisite "trademark use" and caused a likelihood
of consumer confusion, liability in secondary meaning mark
cases effectively turned on the defendant's purpose in applying
the word or symbol. Was its apparent purpose, or intent, sim-
ply to describe its own product (use the word in its primary
sense), or was it to use the word or symbol as a trademark to
indicate source, and thereby potentially mislead consumers?
III. THE MEANING OF "FAIR USE" IN LIGHT OF THE
DOCTRINE'S HISTORICAL ROOTS
As discussed in the prior section, Lanham Act §
1115(b) (4) combines the common-law unfair competition
"use for secondary meaning" limitation with consideration of
the defendant's good or bad faith. This section will discuss
the substance of the resulting "fair use" defense. Subsection A
will discuss how the pre-Lanham Act common law construed
and applied the "use for secondary meaning" requirement,
and how its construction meshed with the common-law re-
quirement that unfair competition defendants act with fraudu-
lent intent or bad faith. Courts tended to commingle these
3 Section 33(b) (4) requires that the defendant use the contested word or symbol "in
good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their geographic
rigin." 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4) (2009).
The early common-law cases imposed infringement liability if the defendant used
the contested word or symbol for its trademark meaning "with intent to defraud," or
"fraudulent intent." The Lanham Act fair use defense excuses the defendant from
liability if he uses the contested word or symbol "otherwise than as a mark," "in good
faith." For purposes of this article, I assume that bad faith is the opposite of good
faith, and I treat the terms "fraudulent intent" and "bad faith" as interchangeable in
this context. Black's Law Dictionary defines "bad faith" as "dishonesty of belief or
purpose." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). It defines a "fraudulent act" as
"conduct involving bad faith . . . ." Id. It defines "fraud" as "a knowing misrepresen-
tation of the truth or concealment of a material fact." Id.
37
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requirements, and evaluate both by focusing on the defen-
dant's apparent purpose in applying the contested word or sym-
bol-as demonstrated by circumstantial evidence. Subsection B
will then review modern courts' construction and application
of Lanham Act § 1115(b) (4), demonstrating that courts have
continued to pursue the same essential purpose-oriented in-
quiry, informed by the same factors of circumstantial evidence.
Subsection C will then argue that the modern fair use defense
effectively turns on an evaluation of the defendant's apparent
purpose in using the contested descriptive or surname word or
symbol, rather than on the likely impact of the defendant's use on
consumers.
The fair use defense thus differs from (and can readily
be reconciled with) the plaintiffs burden to demonstrate that
the defendant made a "trademark use" of the contested word
or symbol, as a part of its case-in-chief. Essentially, the plaintiff
must demonstrate the defendant's use of the word or symbol
in close, direct association with goods or services it was adver-
tising or offering for sale, as objective evidence of likely source-
indicating significance to consumers. However, even after the
plaintiff has made this showing, and even though the defen-
dant's use may cause a likelihood of consumer confusion, the
defendant may avoid liability by demonstrating fair use; that is,
by demonstrating that it applied the contested word or symbol
for the purpose of describing its product, its product's geographic
origin, or to identify himself or herself by name. The fair use
defense thus provides special leeway for competitors to use de-
scriptive and surname words and symbols in marketing their
products, even when the effect of their use might otherwise lead
to a finding of infringement. Such leeway for good-faith use of
descriptive words and symbols for their primary meaning is es-
sential if competitors are to have meaningful access to descrip-
tive language and surnames in their marketing activities.
A. The Pre-Lanham Act Case Law
In Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davidsm' the Supreme Court
expressly distinguished the issue of fraudulent intent from the
issue of whether the defendant used a surname for a trade-
mark (as opposed to its primary) meaning. In that case, the
plaintiff had federally registered its surname mark pursuant to
the Trademark Act of 1905's "ten-year clause." 35 In resolving
'm 233 U.S. 461 (1914).
'5 See supra notes 83-5, and accompanying text.
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the registrant's infringement claim, the Court explained that
federal registration of a secondary meaning mark relieved the
plaintiff of the common-law unfair competition duty to dem-
onstrate that the defendant acted with fraudulent intent. This
was because the 1905 Act's section 16 governed the infringe-
ment cause of action for all federally registered marks, regardless
of whether they constituted technical trademarks or secondary
meaning marks, and section 16 imposed no duty to demon-
strate fraudulent intent.136  However, the Supreme Court
stressed that registration did not expand the scope of the reg-
istrant's common-law rights in a secondary meaning mark: nei-
ther the common law nor registration gave a secondary mean-
ing mark claimant a right to prohibit others from using its
secondary meaning mark for its primary (descriptive, geo-
graphically descriptive, or surname) meaning. 3 1
As a practical matter, finding that the registered secon-
dary meaning mark owner must demonstrate the defendant's
use for trademark meaning, but not bad faith or fraudulent in-
tent, was a formal distinction that made little substantive dif-
ference. As applied by the courts in unregistered secondary
meaning mark cases, the two issues were commingled to the
point of being virtually indistinguishable. '3  Even the Davids
Court's discussion of the "use for the secondary (trademark)
meaning" and "fraudulent intent" requirements demonstrates
the judicial tendency to commingle the two inquiries.'39
Courts and early commentators frequently noted that
the fraudulent intent necessary to demonstrate secondary
meaning mark infringement could be inferred from the cir-
cumstances of the case.140 Courts relied on the same circumstan-
"6 Since section 16 codified the elements of technical trademark infringement, and
fraud was presumed in technical trademark infringement cases, the plaintiff need
not demonstrate fraud. See supra notes 57-62, and accompanying text.
' 233 U.S. at 469-71.
1 See, e.g., Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 235 F. 657, 664 (6th
Cir. 1916) ("the ultimate fact to be proved is fraud, that is, that defendant is using the
words in their secondary, not simply their primary sense, and with the result of pass-
ing off its goods as the goods of appellant.") (emphasis added); (Computing Scale
Co. v. Standard Computing Scale Co., 118 F.965, 967 (6th Cir. 1902) ("When the
word is incapable of becoming a valid trade-mark, because descriptive or geographi-
cal, yet has by use come to stand for a particular maker or vendor, its use by another
in this secondary sense will be restrained as unfair and fraudulent competition")
,emphasis added).The Supreme Court characterized use of a mark for its secondary meaning as a use
that is "calculated to mislead the public with respect to the origin or ownership of
the goods, and thus to invade the right of the registrant to the use of the name or
term as a designation of his merchandise." Davids, 233 U.S. at 470-71. It character-
ized the fraud issue as entailing a showing of "wrongful intent in fact on the part of
the defendant, or facts justifying an inference of such an intent." Id. at 471.
10 See, e.g., Lawrence Mfg. Co. v. Tennessee Mfg. Co., 138 U.S. 537, 551 (1891) (in
unfair competition cases, "deceitful representation or perfidious dealing must be
39
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tial evidence to evaluate both wrongful intent and whether the
defendant used the contested word or symbol for a trademark
meaning, or for its primary (non-trademark) meaning. Thus,
if the evidence supported a finding of bad-faith intent, it also
supported a finding of use for trademark meaning, and vice
versa. If the evidence failed to support a finding of bad-faith
intent, it also would fail to support a finding of use for trade-
mark meaning, and vise versa. There was little practical reason
to distinguish the two issues. While a defendant theoretically
might use a surname or descriptive word for trademark mean-
ing, but lack bad-faith intent to mislead consumers or injure
the plaintiffs business good will, the courts' reliance on the
same factors to prove both issues made it highly unlikely that
they would find this to be the case.
Both in addressing the use for secondary (trademark)
meaning and the bad-faith intent issues, courts focused on the
manner in which the defendant applied the word or symbol,
the truthfulness or accuracy of the defendant's purported de-
scriptive use, and whether the defendant replicated any other
aspects of the plaintiff's label or trade dress.'" Indeed, courts
tended to address both issues through a single inquiry. They
sometimes framed this overall inquiry as whether the defen-
142dant's use was truthful or constituted a false representation.
This truth/falsity inquiry simultaneously addressed whether
the defendant made a false representation (as is required for
fraud) and whether the defendant merely undertook to use
the word or symbol descriptively, that is, truthfully to describe
the qualities, characteristics, or geographic origin of its prod-
ucts. In other cases, courts framed the overarching question as
whether the defendant intended to describe his goods or to in-
made out or be clearly inferable from the circumstances"); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v.
Illinois Watch Co., 179 U.S. 665, 674 (1901) (in unfair competition cases "such cir-
cumstances must be made out as will show wrongful intent in fact, or justify that in-
ference . . ."); Grismore, supra, note 50, at 865 (noting tendency of courts to relax
the proof necessary to demonstrate fraudulent intent: "Fraud may be inferred in
many cases from the fact of imitation alone") (internal citations omitted); 2 NIMs,
supra note 27, at § 351, 1089-91 (describing judicial tendency to infer fraud from the
circumstances of the case).
Some commentators characterized the unfair competition law of the first half
of the Twentieth Century as abandoning the fraudulent intent requirement alto-
gether. See, e.g., 2 CALLMANN, supra note 23, at 1400; 2 NIMs, supra note 27, at § 351.
This perception may be attributable to the courts' amalgamation of the fraud issue
and the "use for secondary meaning" issue.
m See, e.g., 2 NIMs, supra note 27, at §359, 1106, 1110 (describing how a defendant's
fraudulent intent can be ascertained "by the manner in which he uses" the word or
symbol, and discussing cases). With regard to the "use for secondary meaning" re-
%uirement, see the following text and footnotes.
E.g., William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 529 (1924); Canal
Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 327 (1871); Apollo Bros. v. Perkins, 207 F. 530, 533 (3d Cir.
1913); Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Piza, 24 F. 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1885).
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jure the plaintiff and/or free-ride on the good will of plaintiffs
business. 1 Again, the question of the defendant's intent went
both to the issue of bad faith or fraud and to the issue of
whether the defendant used the word or symbol for a trade-
mark, or source-indicating meaning, or only for its primary de-
scriptive or surname meaning. Indeed, use of the word or
symbol for a trademark meaning would seem a necessary pre-
requisite to finding the requisite bad faith/fraudulent intent
to deceive consumers and injure the plaintiffs business good
will. 44
As noted above, courts generally pursued these over-
arching inquiries by asking whether the defendant did more
than use the same or a similar descriptive, geographically de-
scriptive, or surname word or symbol in connection with its
product. They inquired whether the manner and circum-
stances of the defendant's use suggested that she had more in
145
mind than simple, honest description. For example, was the
defendant's use of the word or symbol inaccurate in connec-
tion with its particular product?4  If so, that suggested both a
bad-faith misrepresentation and use for purposes other than
description. Did the defendant reproduce additional aspects
1 See, e.g., Howe Scale Co. of 1886 v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118,
136-40 (1905).
'" See, e.g., Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 235 F. 657, 664 (6th
Cir. 1916) ("the ultimate fact to be proved is fraud, that is, that defendant is using
the words in their secondary, not simply their primary, sense, and with the result of
passing off its goods as the goods of appellant."); DixiePig Corp. v. Pig Stand Co., 31
S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex. App. 1930) (in a secondary meaning mark infringement case
"the ultimate to be proven is fraud, that is, that appellants were using appellee's
trade-mark in its secondary meaning and not simply in a primary sense .... ").
'" Courts frequently noted that in secondary meaning mark infringement cases, a
defendant's wrongdoing was not in the use of the contested word or symbol, per se,
but in the defendant's manner of use. See, e.g., Howe Scale Co., 198 U.S. at 134-36;
McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 252 (1877); Higrade Food Products Corp. v. H.D.
Lee Mercantile Co., 46 F.2d 771, 772 (10th Cir. 1931).
146 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch Brewing 24 F. at 150 (St. Louis brewer who manufactured
and sold "St. Louis Lager Beer" might have no right to prevent other St. Louis brew-
ers from using city name, but could prohibit use of "St. Louis Lager Beer" by com-
petitor who operated no brewery in St. Louis: "[T]he defendant shall not be permit-
ted, by the adoption of a trade-mark which is untrue and deceptive, to sell his own
goods as the goods of the plaintiff, thus injuring the plaintiff and defrauding the
public." (internal citations omitted). Defendant's adoption of "St Louis Lager Beer"
under these circumstances indicated an intent to use the city name not in its pri-
mary, descriptive meaning, but in its trademark meaning, and also indicated fraudu-
lent intent). C.f Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 324-25 (1871) (finding that the
plaintiff, who sold coal under the geographic mark "Lackawanna," had no right to
enjoin use of "Lackawanna" by competitor, whose coal came from the Lackawanna
region and was of the same quality and appearance as the plaintiffs. The Court
stressed that there is no right to relief, absent a "false representation:" "It cannot be
said that there is any attempt to deceive the public when one sells as Kentucky hemp,
or as Lehigh coal, that which in truth is such, or that there is any attempt to appro-
priate the enterprise or business reputation of another who may have previously sold
his goods with the same description.")
41
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of the plaintiffs marketing material, along with the contested
word or symbol? For example, did the defendant reproduce
the printing style or color in which the plaintiff typically dis-
played the word or symbol? ' Did the defendant replicate
other elements of the plaintiffs product label or packaging?
Did the defendant place the contested word or symbol in the
same location on its label?'49 Did the defendant emphasize the
contested word or symbol in a manner designed to grab con-
sumers' immediate attention, or focus them primarily on that
word or symbol, to the exclusion of differentiating material?so
That "something else" beyond mere use of the same or similar
surname or descriptive term, might demonstrate both "use for
trademark (as opposed to primary) meaning" and fraudulent
intent to deceive consumers and interfere with the plaintiffs
14 See, e.g., Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 235 F. 657, 668 (6th
Cir. 1916) (competitor's use of words constituting plaintiff's descriptive mark did not
constitute unfair competition, but might have if defendant had imitated the defen-
dant's lettering); Chickering v. Chickering & Sons, 215 F. 490, 496 (7th Cir. 1914)
(competing producers of pianos had same surname: Court notes that it might consti-
tute unfair competition for the defendant to portray its surname in a manner that
imitates the writing and style in which the plaintiff places its name on its pianos).
148 See, e.g., Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S. 446, 461-62
(1911) (no showing of unfair competition where defendant/competitor used a simi-
lar descriptive word to sell its roofing material, but used a very different "arrange-
ment, color, design [and] general appearance" for its wrappers and the markings on
its packages: Its use of the word did not "amount to a fraud on the public."); Howe
Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118, 135 (1905) (there may be
an unfair competition claim against a defendant of the same surname if, in addition
to using the surname, the defendant imitates the plaintiffs labels, boxes, or pack-
ages, and thereby induces the public to belief that his goods are those of the plain-
tiff.); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 252 (1877) (plaintiff has no right against an-
other person of the same name "unless such other person uses a form of stamp or
label so like that used by the complaining party as to represent that the goods of the
former are the goods of the latter's manufacture"); Grocers Baking Co. v. Sigler, 132
F.2d 498, 499-501 (6th Cir. 1942) (competitor's use of descriptive word similar to the
plaintiff's constitutes unfair competition because competitor also imitates the oval-
shaped figure with symmetrical indentations at each end, on which the plaintiff
places its mark on its bread wrappers); Scriven v. North, 134 F. 366, 376 (4th Cir.
1904) (unfair competition found because defendant not only reproduced plaintiffs
descriptive word in advertising, but also imitated the plaintiffs stamp and product
appearance: "Courts cannot forbid the use of words, which, standing alone and in
their ordinary signification, are common property, or of numerals, which all the
world is free to use, or of labels and stamps of common form, in which on one can
claim an exclusive use, even thought it may be shown that careless persons may in
some instances be misled; but if they are so collocated and stamped upon an article
in manifest imitation of a form previously adopted by another as a means of distin-
guishing his goods, with the deceptive purpose to mislead ... such conduct falls un-
der the ban.").
See, e.g., Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Davids, 233 U.S. 461, 472 (1914) (noting place-
ment of "Davids" in the same position on plaintiffs and defendant's labels).
'5 See CALLMANN, supra note 42, at 195 (describing use of a word or symbol for its
secondary (trademark) meaning as a "catchword" use; a conspicuous use; "a use
which is patently calculated to call the public's attention to the symbol of the adver-
tised article."); Chickering, 215 F. at 496-97 (while competitor may use his own sur-
name, which is the same as the plaintiffs surname, defendant's emphasizing similar
name through use of large lettering may constitute unfair competition).
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business good will. Courts also asked whether the defendant
provided and emphasized its own distinguishing mark, along
with the contested word or symbol, or if the defendant incor-
porated the contested word or symbol into its own brand
name, whether it otherwise differentiated its brand name from
the plaintiff's.m5 Assuming that the defendant knew of the
plaintiffs mark, did it take reasonable precautions to avoid
consumer confusion? A lack of such precautions might indi-
cate that the defendant used the word or symbol for trademark
meaning, rather than simply to describe its own product. It
might likewise provide a basis for inferring fraudulent intent
or bad faith. As a practical matter, the courts' reliance on the
same evidence to demonstrate use for secondary meaning and
bad-faith intent, and their tendency to consider both issues to-
gether resulted in a single inquiry: Did the defendant apply
the word or symbol in order to describe, or in order to indi-
cate source? He would be liable if his apparent purpose was to
indicate source and/or deceive consumers, but not if it was
merely truthfully to describe his product.
A few examples of the Supreme Court's early decisions
may be useful to illustrate. Canal Co. v. Clark 3 is one of the
more famous early Supreme Court decisions to address the
scope of secondary meaning mark protection. In that case the
151 See, e.g., Thaddeus Davids Co., 233 U.S. at 471-72 (noting that the defendant might
have used its own surname in its marketing but also adopted distinguishing matter to
set its products apart from the plaintiffs, which were sold under a similar surname.);
Hygrade Food Products Corp. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 46 F.2d 771, 772-73 (10th
Cir. 1931) (stressing the importance of accompanying the plaintiffs descriptive word
with distinguishing matter); Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co., 235 F. at 668 (competitor's
use of descriptive words "Toasted Corn Flakes" did not constitute unfair competition,
since it accompanied the use with its own prominent "Quaker" mark); Chickerings,
215 F. at 497 (finding that while defendants were entitled to use their surname to
identify themselves as the producers of their pianos, they must accompany the sur-
name with the words "made by," and a differentiating mark printed in larger type
size.). See also Howe Scale Co. v. Wycoff, Seamans & Benedict, 198 U.S. 118, 139-40
(1905) (while defendants used the same sumame-"Remington"-as the plaintiff to
distinguish their products, they sufficiently distinguished their use by combining it
with a second surname-"Remington-Sholes").
A superficial reading of the Supreme Court's decision in Baglin v. Cusenier
Co., 221 U.S. 580 (1911), might lead one to conclude that, while a defendant may
use a descriptive word in which the plaintiff has secondary meaning in descriptive
matter accompanying its product, it may not use the word in its own product brand.
However, such an interpretation would be contrary to the clear implication of other
Supreme Court decisions of the same era which upheld a defendant's use of the
word constituting the secondary meaning mark in its brand name. See, e.g., Standard
Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S. 446 (1911); Canal Co. v. Clark, 80
U.S. 311 (1871). Rather, Baglin should be understood in light of its specific facts. In
that case the defendant had used not just the geographically descriptive word, but
also the plaintiffs trade dress and other composite marks.
15 See, e.g., L.E. Waterman Co. v. Modern Pen Co., 235 U.S. 88, 94 (1914); Comput-
ing Scale Co. v. Standard Computing Scale Co., 118 F. 965, 967 (6th Cir. 1902).
15 Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311 (1871).
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plaintiff, Canal Company, was the first to mine coal in the
Lackawanna Valley, and marketed its coal under the name
"Lackawanna coal" for many years. Mining companies that
subsequently commenced mining in the same geographic re-
gion sold their coal under other names: Pittston coal, Scranton
coal, Lehigh coal, Hazelton coal, Spring Mountain coal, Sugar-
loaf coal, etc. All of the coal mined from the Lackawanna re-
gion was similar in nature, however, and persons in the trade,
when speaking generally, might refer to all coal from that re-
gion as "Lackawanna coal."l5 4
Clark, a coal dealer, sold and advertised the coal he had
for sale as "Lackawanna coal," although that coal had been
sold to him as "Pittston coal" and "Scranton coal;" he sold no
coal produced under the "Lackawanna" designation by the
Canal Co. The Canal Co. sued to enjoin the use, and Supreme
Court rejected the claim, focusing on the fact that the defen-
dant's use was a truthful use of "Lackawanna," which is a geo-
graphically descriptive term:
[There is no] attempt to deceive the public when one sells
as Kentucky hemp, or as Lehigh coal, that which in truth is
such, [nor is] there is any attempt to appropriate the en-
terprise or business reputation of another who may have
previously sold his goods with the same description.
The Court was unwilling to infer use for secondary mean-
ing or bad-faith intent from the defendant's mere truthful use
of the geographically descriptive term in connection with its
product. The Court went on to distinguish earlier cases in
which courts had enjoined use of geographic, descriptive, or
surname marks, noting that they had all involved something
more than was involved in the present case. In particular, the
court distinguished Alvord v. Newman, in which an Akron, Ohio
company selling its cement as "Akron Cement" sued a Syra-
cuse, New York company that was selling its competing cement
as "Onondaga Akron Cement." The Canal Co. Court noted
that the defendant's actions in Alvord constituted attempted
fraud and were therefore properly restrained. However, it
noted that the Alvord case did not prevent other cement pro-
ducers in Akron from calling their products "Akron cement,"
for their use would be truthful.5 6
154 Id.
Id. at 324-25.
'6 Id. at 325-27. The Court conceded that such a use by a subsequent Akron pro-
ducer may have the effect of causing the public to mistake as to the origin or owner-
ship of the product, but if it is just as true in its application to his goods as it is to
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While the Canal court did not expressly differentiate the
"use for secondary meaning" and "fraudulent intent" ele-
ments, its reasoning suggests that both issues turned on
whether the defendant's use of "Lackawanna" truthfully de-
scribed the geographic origin of the coal it was offering for
sale. The truthfulness of the defendant's use was dispositive,
given that there were no other circumstances to indicate bad
faith or an intent to use "Lackawanna" in a trademark sense.
By contrast, in McLean v. Fleming,5 1 the Supreme Court
found that the defendant's use of a surname that was similar to
the plaintiffs surname mark was actionable. The plaintiffs,
who were successors of Dr. Charles McLane, marketed "Dr. C.
McLane's Celebrated Liver Pills," and the defendant, James H.
McLean, commenced selling his own liver pills as "Dr.
McLean's Universal Pills," and later, "Dr. J.H. McLean's Uni-
versal Pills." Although the defendant was using his own name,
the Court stressed that the defendant used very similar packag-
ing, as well as a similar name, noting that: "the form of the box
containing the pills and the general appearance of the wrap-
per which surrounded it were calculated to [mislead and de-
ceive] .", Thus, the surrounding circumstances indicated that
the defendant's purpose was not merely to describe the prod-
ucts as his own creation, but to deceive consumers about the
source of the product. The evidence of replicating both mark
and trade dress indicated that the defendant used the name
for a trademark meaning, for the purpose of deceiving con-
sumers about the source of his pills. He could be enjoined.16o
Finally, in Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg.
Co.,' 6 the plaintiff manufactured strips of roofing material,
which it sold in rolls with paper wrappers bearing the words
those of another who first applied it, and who therefore claims an exclusive right to use
it, there is no legal or moral wrong done. Purchasers may be mistaken, but they are not de-
ceived by false representations, and equity will not enjoin against telling the truth.
Id. at 327.
157 In concluding, the Court stressed:
By advertising and selling coal brought from the Lackawanna Valley as
Lackawanna coal, [Clark) has made no false representation, and we see no
evidence that he has attempted to sell his coal as and for the coal of the
plaintiffs. If the public are led into mistake, it is by the truth, not by any
false pretense. If the complainants' sales are diminished, it is because they
are not the only producers of Lackawanna coal, and not because of any
fraud of the defendant."
Id. at 328.
8 96 U.S. 245 (1877).
9 Id., 96 U.S. at 255.
* However, the injunction that the Court upheld only prohibited the defendant
from using the "McLean" name "upon any label or wrapper for boxes or other pack-
ages of pills" resembling or imitating those of the plaintiff. Id. at 250-51.
220 U.S. 446 (1911).
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"Ruberoid Roofing." The defendant manufactured roofing
made from a different kind of material, which it sold in simi-
larly sized rolls under the name "Rubbero Roofing." Even
though the plaintiffs roofing contained no rubber, the Su-
preme Court found that the word "Ruberoid" was descriptive
of the product, and thus could not constitute a technical
trademark. The Court declined to permit the plaintiff to en-
join the defendant's use of "Rubbero," stressing that the gen-
eral appearance of the parties' wrappers and markings was
quite different. The only thing the plaintiff could complain of
was the similarity of "Rubbero" to the descriptive term "Ruber-
oid." To preclude the defendant's use of "Rubbero" because
of its resemblance to "Ruberoid" would "be to give the word
'Ruberoid' the full effect of a trademark, while denying its va-
lidity as such." 63 The defendant appeared to have used the
word "Rubbero" truthfully only to describe its product, not in
"such a way as to amount to a fraud on the public."6
In each of the three cases described above, the Supreme
Court considered the issues of "use for secondary (trademark)
meaning" and bad-faith intent in an undifferentiated manner
and required evidence beyond the defendant's use of a similar
surname or descriptive word or symbol to establish those ele-
ments. The evidence the opinions suggest to be relevant in-
clude inaccuracy of the descriptive or surname use, the man-
ner of the defendant's use, and whether the defendant
reproduced packaging or other marketing materials beyond
the word constituting the plaintiffs secondary meaning mark.
The ultimate inquiry was the defendant's apparent purpose in
using the contested word or symbol.
B. Construction and Application of Lanham Act § 1115(b) (4)
As discussed supra, Congress intended Lanham Act §
1115(b) (4) to preserve the common-law "use for secondary
meaning" limitation for secondary meaning marks. 16 The
stated policies underlying § 1115(b) (4) are the same as those
underlying its common-law predecessor. As the Supreme
Court recently emphasized in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
162 The plaintiff described its product as being in the "nature of soft, flexible rubber."
Id., at 454. Resorting to a dictionary, the Court found that the combination of "Rub-
ber" and "oid" conveyed the meaning: "having the form or resemblance of rubber,"
or "rubber-like." Id. at 455.
163 Id.
1' Id. at 461-62.
165 See supra notes 122-34, and accompanying text.
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Lasting Impression I, Inc., neither the common-law nor the
Lanham Act may be applied to "deprive commercial speakers
of the ordinary utility of descriptive words."'66 Courts and
commentators routinely note that the Lanham Act fair use de-
fense is substantively equivalent to the common-law "use for
. 167.
secondary meaning" limitation and limits rights in descrip-
tive and surname words and symbols to their source-identifying
significance. Another's use of a claimed word or symbol in its
descriptive or surname capacity will not infringe.
To qualify for the statutory defense, the defendant must
have used the surname or descriptive word or symbol "other-
wise than as a mark," "fairly and in good faith only to describe"
its own goods or services. 69 The phrase "otherwise than as a
trademark" carries forward the common-law distinction be-
tween use of a word or symbol for its "primary" meaning and
use of it for a "secondary" (trademark) meaning, and affirms
that trademark meaning is the only aspect of a surname or de-
scriptive word that trademark law regulates.170 The statutory
requirement that the defendant act "in good faith'' only to
"" 543 U.S. at 122. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra, note 42, at
cmt. a ("the owner of a trademark ... cannot deprive others of the use of the term in
its original descriptive sense"); see also Hearings on H.R. 102 supra, note 125, at 72
(testimony of Wallace Martin, Chairman of ABA Committee on Trademark Legisla-
tion) ("Everybody has got a right to the use of the English Language and has got a
right to assume that nobody is going to take that English language away from him.").
E.g., Venetianaire Corp. of Am. v. A & P Imp Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 1081 (2d Cir.
1970); M.B.H. Enters. Inc. v. WOKY, Inc., 633 F.2d 50, 52 n.2 (7th Cir. 1980); Des-
sert Beauty, Inc. v. Fox, 568 F. Supp. 2d 416, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28 cmt. a (1995); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:49 (4th ed. 1994).
The Lanham Act's fair use defense applies both to registered marks and to un-
registered marks asserted pursuant to Lanham Act § 43(a). RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 42, § 28, cmt. a.
"" Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir. 1995)
(even if the word or symbol is inherently distinctive as to the plaintiffs goods or ser-
vices, a defendant may still use it fairly to describe its own). See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 42, at cmt. a ("The owner of a trade-
mark ... cannot deprive others of the use of the term in its original descriptive sense.
Reasonable use of a descriptive term by another solely to describe the nature or
characteristics of its own goods or services will not subject the user to liability for in-
fringement.").
15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (4).
17o See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 42, at § 28, cmt. a,
at 294 ("The defense of fair use under the law of trademarks is limited to use of the
original descriptive or personal name significance of a term. This limitation on the
scope of the fair use doctrine is sometimes described by stating that the doctrine ap-
plies only to use "otherwise than as a trademark," or only to "non-trademark use" of an-
other's mark") (emphasis added).
"' Good faith, for purposes of Lanham Act § 1115(b) (4), does not turn on the de-
fendant's knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of the plaintiffs prior use of the word or
symbol. Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 270 (2d Cir.
1995); Dessert Beauty, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 427; MCCARTHY, supra note 21, at 11-19 to 11-
20. A defendant may know of the plaintiffs use and still intend only to describe the
qualities and characteristics of its own goods. However, if the defendant intended to
47
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describe" its goods continues the common-law practice of in-
tertwining the "use for secondary (trademark) meaning" pues-
tion with the issue of the defendant's purpose or intent. Es-
sentially, the Lanham Act implements only one change from
the common law: Rather than require the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant's purpose was non-descriptive and in bad-
faith, the Lanham Act shifts the burden to the defendant to
prove that its purpose was purely descriptive and in good faith.
Courts evaluating Lanham Act fair use defenses consider
essentially the same elements of circumstantial evidence as they
did under the common law of unfair competition. First, courts
examine how the defendant employed the word or symbol-its
prominence, style, and placement on the defendant's labels,
packaging, or advertising, along with any physical similarities
to the plaintiffs presentation and packaging.' 3  As before,
such considerations provide circumstantial evidence of the de-
fendant's purpose in using the word or symbol.
These factors may also suggest how consumers perceive
the use, but consumer perceptions clearly are not the courts'
primary focus. For example, courts have often found a defen-
dant's very prominent placement on packaging and/or em-
phasis upon the word or symbol in advertising to constitute a
fair use, when the defendant also prominently displayed its
own mark on the label, packaging, or advertising.'7 4 Merchants
tap the source-indicating significance of the word or symbol, and thus trade on the
plaintiffs business good will by creating confusion about source or sponsorship,
rod faith will be lacking and the fair use defense will not apply.
To the extent that "fairness" is deemed to be a separate requirement under
Lanham Act § 33(b) (4), it is understood to go to the defendant's commercial justifi-
cation for its descriptive use of the word or symbol, and to the accuracy of the de-
scription. See, e.g., KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 123 ("Accuracy . .. has to be a consid-
eration in considering whether a use is fair"). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 42, at § 28, cmt. c (suggesting that to be "fair," the
descriptive use should accurately describe an important aspect of the defendant's
goods or services.).
See, e.g., Venetianaire Corp. of Am. v. A&P Imp. Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 1080, 1082
(2d Cir. 1970) (court finds use as a trademark, noting, in particular, the way the de-
fendant mimicked the plaintiffs type style, figurative design and placement of the
descriptive word "Hygient," and the word's prominent display on the defendant's
packaging); Dessert Beauty, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 426 ("Descriptive use is often evident in
the manner of use, such as the 'physical nature of the use in terms of size, location,
and other characteristics in comparison with the appearance of other descriptive
matter or other trademarks"') (quoting EMI Catalogue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Con-
nors, Cosmopulos, Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 65 (2d Cir. 2000)); Corbitt Mfg Co. v. GSO Am.,
Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1377 (S.D. Ga. 2002) ("'[L]ettering, type-style, size and
visual placement and prominence of the challenged words are factors in determining
whether a term is being used as a trademark") (quoting McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:46 (4' ed. 2002)). See also notes 148-53, supra and
accompanying text.
m See, e.g., Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 63940 (7th Cir. 2001)
(although plaintiffs trademarked phrase was the most prominent text and an atten-
tion-getting symbol, Seventh Circuit found that the use was a "non-trademark use,"
stressing that the defendant newspaper's own mark [its masthead] also appeared
[Vol. 28:1
HeinOnline  -- 28 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 48 2010-2011
2010] RECONCILING FAIR USE AND TRADEMARK USE
may, and frequently do, claim trademark rights in multiple
words and symbols on their labels and packaging. Thus, even
if the defendant places other identifying marks on the same
label or packaging, consumers may understand the contested
word or symbol to indicate source. The courts' emphasis on
the presence of another, distinguishing mark demonstrates a
focus upon the defendant's apparent purpose, rather than
upon the likely impact of the defendant's use on consumers.
If the defendant also prominently displays its own brand, its
purpose in employing the plaintiffs descriptive word or sym-
bol is more likely to describe than to identify source.
As in the pre-Lanham Act common law, courts also con-
sider the relevance or accuracy of the descriptive meaning in
connection with the defendant's product or service, 7 5 and the
presence or absence (as opposed to the effectiveness) of pre-
cautionary measures to avoid consumer confusion.17 6 Again,
these inquiries shed light on the defendant's purpose in apply-
ing the surname or descriptive word or symbol.
Modern courts have suggested some additional factors
that may be relevant to evaluating fair use, including whether
the defendant filed an application to register the word or sym-
bol at issue 1 or placed a @ or TM symbol near it;1 the availabil-
ity of alternative, equally effective descriptive terms;"7 the
with the plaintiffs phrase); Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's
U.S.A. Co., 125 F.3d 28, 31, (2d Cir. 1997) ("So long as the defendants in good faith
are using the phrase in its descriptive sense and prominently identifying the product
with the defendants' marks, the defendants incur no liability simply because the ma-
terials containing the descriptive phrase are so widely disseminated as to form some
degree of association in the public's mind between the phrase and the product");
Car-Freshner Corp., 70 F.3d at 270 (although the defendant's use of the plaintiffs de-
scriptive symbol was highly prominent and noticeable, Second Circuit found fair use,
emphasizing that the defendant prominently displayed its own mark, as well); Citrus
Group, Inc. v. Cadbury Beverages, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 386, 391-92 (D. Md. 1991) (de-
fendant prominently placed phrase "Main Squeeze" in print advertisements, radio
ads, and on the front of t-shirts and towels, but there was no trademark use: The de-
fendant also prominently displayed its trademark and trade dress on the product and
promotional items, along with the contested phrase). Schmid Labs. v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 14, 17, 20 (D.N.J. 1979) (No "trademark use," even
though defendant's packaging prominently displayed the contested word in large
capital letters. The court noted that the defendant also prominently displayed its own
mark on the packaging); See also note 152, supra, and accompanying text.
17 E.g., EMI Catalogue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d
56, 64-65 (2d Cir. 2000); Rainforest Caf6, Inc. v. Amazon, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 886,
906 (D. Minn. 1999); Woodroast Sys., Inc. v. Rests. Unlimited, Inc., 793 F. Supp. 906,
913-14 (D. Minn. 1992). See note 147, supra.
76 See, e.g., Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 796 (5th Cir.
1983); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION§ 28 cmt. c (1995). See also
notes 152-53, supra, and accompanying text.
"' Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 796; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28
cmt. c (1995).
'78 Sports Authority, Inc. v. Abercrombie & Fitch, Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d 925, 936 (E.D.
Mich. 1997); Dessert Beauty, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 424.
"' KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 609 (9th
Cir. 2005).
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strength or fame of the plaintiffs mark;se and the degree of
confusion likely to be caused by the purported fair use. Like
the earlier factors, these suggest an undertaking to evaluate
the defendant's purpose. Clearly an undertaking to register or
otherwise assert rights in the contested word or symbol ad-
dresses the defendant's purpose, not consumer perceptions.
Moreover, if the plaintiffs mark is widely known, and there are
equally effective alternative words or symbols to describe the
defendant's product or service, that might support an infer-
ence that the defendant selected the word or symbol strategi-
cally, to appropriate the plaintiffs business good will, rather
than merely to describe its goods. Indeed, the degree of likely
consumer confusion may constitute circumstantial evidence of
the defendant's purpose-a purpose merely to describe gener-
ally is likely to result in a lower level of consumer confusion
112than a purpose to indicate source.
Finally, as in pre-Lanham Act common law, one finds
courts consolidating their evaluation of the defendant's use
"otherwise than as a mark" with their evaluation of the defen-
dant's "good faith,",8 and relying on the same factors to de-
termine both.8m Modern courts state that an infringement de-
18 Id.
18 In KP Permanent, the Supreme Court ruled that a likelihood of confusion would
not rule out fair use, but declined to decide whether the degree of likely confusion
was a relevant consideration. KP Permanent, 543 U.S. at 123. The Ninth Circuit, on
remand, has ruled it relevant. 408 F.3d 596, 609 (2005). See also Shakespeare Co. v.
Silstar Corp. of Am., Inc., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that the degree
of confusion may be relevant to determining whether a use is fair). But see Graeme
W. Austin, Essay, Tolerating Confusion about Confusion: Trademark Policies and Fair Use,
50 ARIz. L. REv. 157 (2008) (arguing that consideration of likelihood of confusion in
determining fair use is inappropriate).
182 This proposition is consistent with courts' practice in the likelihood of confusion
determination itself, where the opposite inference is made: Evidence of the defen-
dant's intent to deceive consumers may constitute evidence that the defendant suc-
ceeded in creating a likelihood of confusion. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION, supra note 42, at § 22, cmt. c. In the fair use context, evidence of a
relatively low level of confusion may constitute evidence that the defendant's pur-
pose was not to create confusion.
The practice of considering whether the defendant had alternative words or symbols
at his disposal appears to be inconsistent with Congress' intent in enacting Lanham
Act § 1115(b) (4): Congress rejected an amendment that would have limited the fair
use defense to cases in which use of the word or symbol at issue was "necessary." See
sypra note 127, and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. §1115(b) (4).
18 In discussing the good faith issue, courts inquire whether the defendant emphasized
the contested word or symbol, or emulated the plaintiffs style or manner of presenting it. See,
e.g., Venetianaire Corp., 429 F.2d at 1083; Dessert Beauty, 568 F.Supp.2d at 428;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28 cmt. d (1995). They ask
whether the defendant displayed its own mark along with the descriptive word or symbol.
E.g., Int'l Stamp Art, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 456 F.3d 1270, 1275(11th
Cir. 2006); Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 642 (7th Cir. 2001); EMI
Catalogue P'ship, 228 F.3d at 67; Cosmetically Sealed Indus., 125 F.3d at 30. And they
also ask whether the defendant's use of the descriptive word or symbol was truthful and accurate
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fendant lacks good faith if it applies the descriptive word or
symbol with the intention of creating a likelihood of consumer
confusion, and thus trading on the plaintiffs business good
will. This definition of "good faith" is the reverse side of the
"bad faith" or "fraudulent intent" that the common-law re-
quired the plaintiff to demonstrate. This inquiry, in com-
bination with the "use otherwise than as a trademark" inquiry,
focuses on the defendant's purpose, not on the likely impact
of the use on consumers.
A number of fair use decisions appear to dispense with
separate use "otherwise than as a mark" and "good faith" in-
quiries altogether and resolve the fair use issue strictly on the
court's evaluation of the defendant's purpose in employing
the contested word or symbol." This should not be surpris-
ing, since the fair use defense is meant to give marketplace ac-
tors meaningful leeway to use descriptive words or symbols in
their purely descriptive capacity, without fear of infringement
liability. An evaluation that turns on the defendant's apparent
purpose, rather than the effect of its actions, better accom-
plishes this goal.
C. A "Purpose" Standard
As discussed earlier, the interests in robust marketplace
competition and marketplace efficiency require that all par-
ticipants have meaningful access to the words and symbols they
need to communicate their products' qualities and character-
istics effectively to consumers. Removing such words and sym-
with regard to its goods. Int'l Stamp Art, 456 F.3d at 1275. Did the defendant have
equally effective alternative means of describing its product but nonetheless choose de-
scriptors similar to the plaintiffs mark? Int'l Stamp Art, 456 F.3d at 1276; EMI Cata-
logue P'ship, 228 F.3d at 67; Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phonix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d
1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1984). Did the defendant take reasonable precautions to prevent
consumer confusion? Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 796; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 28 cmt. d (1995).
11 Int'l Stamp Art, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 456 F.3d 1270,1274-75 (11th
Cir. 2006); EMI Catalogue P'ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228
F.3d 56, 66 (2d Cir. 2000); Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 267 F.3d 628, 642 (7th
Cir. 2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 42, at § 28
cmt. d.
This statement echoes pre-Lanham Act descriptions of a defendant's fraudulent in-
tent which, along with a showing that the defendant used the surname or descriptive
word or symbol "for its secondary meaning," was a prerequisite to a secondary mean-
ing mark claimant's recovery. See supra notes 46-51, 135-53, and accompanying text.
1 See, e.g., Packman, 267 F.3d at 642 ("the defendants' good faith "can be judged
only by inquiry into [their] subjective purpose in using the slogan[]") (quotingMBH
Enters., Inc. v. WOKY, Inc., 633 F.2d 50, 54 (7th Cir. 1980)).
1 E.g., Door Sys., Inc. v. Overhead Door Sys., Inc., 905 F. Supp. 492, 497 fn.4 (N.D.
Ill. 1995), affd, 83 F.3d 169 (7th Cir. 1996); Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1976); Citrus Group, Inc. v. Cadbury Bever-
ages, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 386, 391-93 (D. Md. 1991); Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline
Cochran, 201 F. Supp. 861, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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bols from competitors' reach would reduce the flow of useful,
truthful information to consumers, 1 raise consumer search
costs," and raise a bar to new entrants to the market.'9o In ad-
dition, recognizing broad rights in descriptive words and sym-
bols may interfere with important First Amendment interests,
even in cases in which the alleged infringing use can be
deemed commercial speech.'9 '
A "defendant's purpose" standard better accommodates
these concerns than would a "consumer perception" standard
that finds fair use only when consumers are demonstrably
unlikely to take source-indicating meaning from the defen-
dant's use. 1 Given steadily expanding notions of what con-
18 Graeme W. Austin, supra, note 182, at 188; Uche U. Ewelukwa, Comparative Trade-
mark Law: Fair Use Defense in the United States and Europe-The Changing Landscape of
Trademark Law, 13 WEIDENER L. REv. 97, at 127 (2006); Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v.
Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 951 (7th Cir. 1992)).
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark
Use, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1669, 1689 (2007); 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION
AND PRACTICE, § 5.09(5) (2005).
190 2 J. T. McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:45
(4th ed. 2008); Austin, supra note 182, at 17-18; Rebecca Tushnet, Trademark Law as
Commercial Speech Regulation, 58 S.C. L. REv. 737, 744 (2007); Michael Fuller, "Fair
Use" Trumps Likelihood of Confusion in Trademark Law the Supreme Court Rules in KP Per-
manent v. Lasting Impression, 2006 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 11001 at 2.
191 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 565
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (the fair use defense "prevents the award of a
trademark from regulating a substantial amount of noncommercial speech."); Mi-
chael Machat, The Practical Significance of the Supreme Court Decision in KP Permanent
Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 95 TRADEMARK REP. 825, 836 (2005) ("the
fair use defense is a safety valve designed to give the public confidence that aggres-
sive trademark owners seeking to gain monopoly power over words will not have the
power to interfere with the public's ability to use words in their ordinary meaning in
the course of their business and within the scope of their personal affairs"). See also
Rebecca Tushnet, supra note 191 (noting that serious First Amendment concerns
arise, even though trademark law addresses commercial speech); Lisa P. Ramsey, De-
scriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REv. 1095 (2003) (arguing
that the First Amendment prohibits trademark protection for descriptive marks).
192 See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impressions I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122
(2004):
The common law's tolerance of a certain degree of confusion on the part
of consumers followed from the very fact that in cases like this one an
originally descriptive term was selected to be used as a mark, not to men-
tion the undesirability of allowing anyone to obtain a complete monopoly
on use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it first. Canal Co. v. Clark,
13 Wall., at 323-24, 327. The Lanham Act adopts a similar leniency, there
being no indication that the statute was meant to deprive commercial
speakers of the ordinary utility of descriptive words. "If any confusion re-
sults, that is a risk the plaintiff accepted when it decided to identify its
product with a mark that uses a well known descriptive phrase." Cosmeti-
cally Sealed Industries, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co., 125 F.3d, at 30. This
right to describe is the reason that descriptive terms qualify for registration
as trademarks only after taking on secondary meaning as "distinctive of the
applicant's goods." 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f), with the registrant getting an ex-
clusive right not in the original, descriptive sense, but only in the secondary
one associated with the markholder's goods. (citations omitted).
See also Austin, supra note 182, at 177 (noting that under the fair use defense, con-
sumer confusion must sometimes be tolerated "to allow firms to make descriptive
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sumer perceptions are actionable, 3 and the self-fulfilling na-
ture of mark owners' claims regarding consumer association, 4
a standard of fair use that focuses primarily on likely consumer
perceptions will readily lead to infringement liability for good-
faith use of words and symbols to describe products and ser-
vices. This will chill marketplace actors' willingness to use de-
scriptive words or symbols in productive, pro-competitive ways.
A "defendant purpose" standard affords merchants some lee-
way for honest misjudgment.
A "defendant purpose" standard is also consistent with
the Supreme Court's reasoning in KP Permanent.'9 5 In KP, the
Supreme Court held that the fair use defense may be available
to defendants even though their use creates a likelihood of consumer
confusion, because, as a general matter, merchants' ability to
use descriptive words and symbols in communicating the
qualities and characteristics of their goods to consumers is of
greater public concern than preventing all consumer confusion.'
Implicit in this reasoning is the understanding that in some
cases of fair use, consumers will understand the defendant's
use to indicate source. If the use did not communicate source,
then there could not be any likelihood of consumer confu-
uses of otherwise-protected marks. Curtailing the trademark monopoly on descrip-
tive words facilitates competition; it may also protect after-markets for such things as
second-hand goods, sundries, and repair services."); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 191, §
11:45 at 11-90.19, 11.93 (characterizing the purpose of the fair use defense as provid-
ing a competitive balance and ensuring that trademark law cannot forbid commer-
cial use of terms in the descriptive sense).
' See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Reconciling Trademark Rights and Expressive Values:
How to Stop Wonying and Learn to Love Ambiguity, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPoRARY RESEARCH 11-14 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D.
Janis eds., 2007) (discussing how courts' understanding of "consumer confusion" has
been extended to the point that confusion no longer provides meaningful limits to
trademark rights to accommodate countervailing expressive interests); Austin, supra
note 182, (discussing how courts' analysis of consumer confusion fails to serve as a
meaningful check on trademark rights or to provide a meaningful opportunity to
accommodate countervailing interests, such as competition and First Amendment
concerns); Barrett, supra note 3, at 985 (discussing how courts have stretched the
concept of "consumer confusion" in a range of different situations, and citing illus-
trative cases.).
19 See, e.g., Austin, supra note 182, at 177 (discussing how marketers deliberately
shape consumer perceptions); McKenna, supra note 5, at 776-77 (relying on con-
sumer perceptions is problematic in trademark law because "the relevant consumer
beliefs are those regarding 'source,' an extraordinarily vague concept capable of en-
compassing almost any imaginable relationship between parties," and providing illus-
tration); id. at 822 (noting how "highly suggestible" consumer perceptions can be,
and how trademark doctrine and consumer expectations "feed off each other, creat-
ing an endless loop," so that "what consumers know (or think they know) about the
law shapes expectations, which then feed back into the law only to influence future
expectations").
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 116-17
2004).
, Id. at 121-23. The Supreme Court noted, however, that the degree of confusion
might be relevant in some cases to determine whether a defendant used the mark
only for descriptive purposes.
53
HeinOnline  -- 28 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 53 2010-2011
54 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT
sion."' That being the case, some other (non-consumer-
perception-based) standard for identifying use "otherwise than
as a mark" is necessary. A standard that exonerates defendants
who endeavor, in good faith, to make a solely descriptive use
(even though their use in fact indicates source to consumers
and creates consumer confusion), while penalizing intention-
ally source-indicating, bad-faith uses, would seem to fill the
bill. Such a standard better reflects the historic understanding
that conditioned protection of secondary meaning marks in
the first place. 1
A "defendant purpose" standard of fair use is also consis-
tent with other recent Supreme Court decisions that have re-
peatedly demonstrated the Justices' desire to check expansion
of trademark rights in order to accommodate competing in-
terests and values. In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros.,
Inc.,'" the Court significantly restricted the scope of trade
dress protection for product features, reasoning that expansive
rights in product features would be harmful to competition
and progress in the useful arts. The Court stressed the pub-
lic's interest in permitting competitors to adopt the utilitarian
and aesthetic benefits of unpatented product design features,
and found that this interest outweighed concerns about poten-
tial consumer confusion that might result from conditioning
all product feature trade dress protection on a showing of sec-
ondary meaning. 200 In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays,
' Professor McKenna has questioned the Supreme Court's decision in KP Permanent
Make-Up, because there cannot simultaneously be non-trademark use (as required in
Lanham Act § 1115(b) (4)) and a likelihood of consumer confusion-the two ele-
ments are mutually exclusive. See McKenna, supra note 5, at 802-05. However,
McKenna is assuming that section 115(b) (4) "non-trademark use" is the opposite of
the "trademark use" required under sections 32(1) (a) and 43(a). However, in light
of the historical development discussed above, this assumption is incorrect.
' That is, a purpose-based standard is consistent with the early common-law under-
standing that rights in secondary meaning marks turned not on property notions,
but on the defendant's improper purpose. See notes 46-49, supra, and accompanying
text.
'9529 U.S. 205 (2000).
W Id. at 213-15 ("Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition
with regard to the utilitarian and aesthetic purposes that product design ordinarily
serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants
based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness. . . . Competition is deterred . . . not
merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit, and given the
unlikelihood of inherently source-identifying design, the game of allowing suit based
upon alleged inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle."). See David
S. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New Millennium, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1659, 1679 (2007) (The Wal-Mart decision sent "a message that
trademark protection had to compete with other concepts that also form the basis of
trademark law, such as consumer protection.").
In Wal-Mart, the Court determined that all product feature trade dress claim-
ants must demonstrate secondary meaning as a prerequisite to an infringement
claim. While some product feature trade dress might be inherently distinctive, the
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Inc., the Supreme Court further restricted protection for
product feature trade dress by tightening the standard of non-
functionality. Again, the Court reasoned that a strong func-
tionality doctrine (which prevents assertion of trade dress
rights in utilitarian product features, even when they commu-
nicate source to consumers) serves the public's interest in
competition and a strong public domain. In Dastar Corp. v.
203
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the Supreme Court signifi-
cantly restricted use of Lanham Act § 43(a) infringement
claims to vindicate attribution interests in expressive works.
The Court reasoned that the public interest in relegating un-
copyrighted works to the public domain outweighed concerns
about consumer confusion that might arise from alleged mis-
204attribution of authorship. The KP decision itself reinforces
this message, construing the fair use defense more broadly
than a number of circuit courts had done, and reemphasizing
the competitive and communicative importance of access to
descriptive words and symbols and unfettered marketplace
communications. Requiring infringement plaintiffs to demon-
lack of an effective standard for evaluating the distinctiveness of product features,
coupled with the potential harm that litigation threats and liberal product fea-
ture protection might pose to competition and progress in the useful arts, counseled
against recognition of "inherent distinctiveness" in that category of potential source
indicators.
2 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
m Id. at 29 ("Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition that in many
instances there is no prohibition against coping goods and products. . . . As the
Court has explained, copying is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws
which preserve our competitive economy. Allowing competitors to copy will have
salutary effects in many instances.") (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989)). As I have discussed elsewhere, the TrafFix Court re-
jected a functionality standard that assigned equal weight to the trademark interest
in preventing consumer confusion and the interest in permitting competitors to copy
unpatented product features. The TrajFix Court clearly found that the interest in
permitting copying outweighed the competing trademark interests. See Barrett, Con-
solidating The Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress Functionality: Encountering TrajFix on the Way to
Sears, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 79 (2004); see also David S. Welkowitz, supra note 201 at
1680 (TrajFix "implied that the trademark law is intended to preserve our competi-
tive economy,' not to grant proprietary rights to trademark owners.").
2 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
2 Id. at 34 ("Assuming for the sake of argument that Dastar's representation of itself
as the 'Producer' of its videos amounted to a representation that it originated the
creative work conveyed by the videos, allowing a cause of action under § 43(a) for
that representation would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the
public's 'federal right to copy and to use' expired copyrights." (quoting Bonito Boats,
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989))).
In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), the Supreme Court
again took a restrictive approach to expanded trademark rights by adopting a con-
struction of the Lanham Act § 43(c) dilution cause of action that essentially nullified
it. The opinion strongly questioned whether dilution protection served the best in-
terests of consumers. Id. at 429 ("Unlike traditional infringement law, the prohibi-
tions against trademark dilution are not the product of common-law development
and are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers"). Subsequently, Con-
gress legislatively overruled that decision by enacting the Trademark Dilution Revi-
sion Act of 2006.
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strate "trademark use" (based on an objective measure of likely
consumer perception) as a part of their case-in-chief, and con-
struing the fair use defense in a manner that best enables
good-faith marketplace uses of descriptive words and symbols,
furthers the same basic competition interests that the Supreme
Court undertook to shelter in the Wal-Mart/TraJFix/Dastar/KP
Permanent line of cases.
IV. "TRADEMARK USE" VERSUS USE "OTHERWISE THAN
AS A MARK"
The focus on the defendant's purpose, in evaluating fair
use, differentiates the § 1115(b) (4) use "otherwise than as a
mark" from the "trademark use" that infringement plaintiffs
must demonstrate under Lanham Act §§ 32(1) (a) and 43(a).
The requirement that infringement plaintiffs demonstrate the
defendant's "trademark use" serves a screening or "gate-
keeping" function, limiting assertions of trademark rights to
those cases in which potential consumer confusion is likely to
be material and detrimental from a societal standpoint.20s As I
have argued elsewhere, this trademark use requirement
(which derives from the "affixation or other close association"
requirement in the common law and the Trademark Act of
1905)206 should be construed to require: 1) that the defen-
dant's use of the contested word or symbol be perceptible to
consumers; 2) that the defendant closely and directly associate
the word or symbol with goods or services it is advertising or
offering for sale; and 3) that the defendant's application of the
word or symbol be likely to make a separate commercial im-
pression on consumers." These relatively objective factors to-
gether provide some assurance that consumers may look to the
contested word or symbol for information about the source of
the defendant's goods or services. The factors thus serve as a
proxy for more fact-intensive findings regarding actual con-
sumer perception, and enable courts efficiently to identify
cases in which potential consumer confusion costs are unlikely
to justify the societal costs of protracted litigation, and dispose
208
of them early in the litigation process.
The plaintiffs initial burden to demonstrate the defen-
dant's "trademark use" thus promotes judicial efficiency, and
M Barrett, supra note 4, at 971.
2 See supra notes 65-70, 106-121, and accompanying text.
' Barrett, supra note 4, at 969-76.
2WId.
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limits the chilling effects that threats of protracted, expensive
infringement litigation may have on marketplace actors seek-
ing to make socially beneficial (albeit unauthorized) uses of
marks, or words or symbols that resemble marks.2" Requiring
plaintiffs to demonstrate "trademark use" also promotes First
Amendment interests by limiting infringement claims, in most
cases, to a defendant's commercial speech, where the trade-
mark claimants' interests may more likely outweigh the free
210
speech concerns. It protects marketplace efficiency by ac-
commodating an unhampered flow of useful product informa-
tion and critiques to consumers, and helps to prevent asser-
tion of trademark rights in a range of anti-competitive ways.
Particularly in the digital context, the trademark use require-
ment may prevent trademark interests from unnecessarily
chilling the development of new media and new business
212
models that can benefit consumers -new technologies that
(through novel or hidden applications of marks) provide con-
sumers with efficient, customized digital indexing, reference
and search services, as well as customized advertising tailored
to individual consumer interests (all of which may lower con-
sumer search costs, and thus enhance competition) . Appli-
cation of this relatively certain and objective "trademark use"
requirement in the digital context may also serve proactively to
shape consumer expectations and thus counteract the forces
that increasingly suggest a licensing or sponsoring relationship
whenever a mark is applied in a context not of the mark
214owner's creation.
2 Such uses include providing consumer reviews of products, enhancing Internet
search capabilities, and providing useful indexing services and information about
aftermarket replacement parts and compatible accessories. This requirement also
facilitates a vibrant range of purely expressive uses ("That's the Rolls-Royce of golf
courses;" "My sister's a real Barbie Doll;" "It was an Alka-Seltzer moment!").
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000) ("Competi-
tion is deterred . . . not merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat of suc-
cessful suit . . ."); Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extorion: The End of Trademark Law, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 585 (2008) (describing growing levels of "trademark extortion"-
the use of strike suits to deter market entrants). Cf William McGeveran, Rethinking
Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOwA L. REV. 49 (expressing the need for a doctrine to avoid
the chilling effect of protracted trademark litigation on speech, but rejecting the
trademark use requirement as a means to address the problem).
210 See Barrett, supra note 4, at 965, and sources cited therein.
211 Id. at 966-67, and sources cited therein.
212 Id., at 967, and sources cited therein.
2 Id.
2 Id. Such a proactive stance (defining trademark use in a manner that may guide
consumer perceptions to some extent) may be necessary in order to counteract what
commentators have sometimes described as the "circular" or "reactive" nature of
consumer perceptions. See Dogan & Lemley, supra note 5, at 1693-95 (noting the
"circular" and "reactive" nature of a likelihood of confusion standard absent a
trademark use limitation); McKenna, supra note 5, at 776, 822 (noting how "highly
57
HeinOnline  -- 28 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 57 2010-2011
58 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT
But while the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate "trade-
mark use" constitutes a first step in maintaining the proper
balance of marketplace interests, the fair use determination
fine-tunes it, to accommodate the special concerns that arise
when businesses claim exclusive rights in surnames and de-
scriptive words and symbols. A defendant may make a "trade-
mark use" of the plaintiffs descriptive word or symbol, for pur-
poses of Lanham Act §§ 32(1) (a) and 43 (a), but nonetheless use
the word or symbol "otherwise than as a mark" for purposes of
§ 1115(b) (4). It may do this by demonstrating that even
though it "affixed or closely associated" a confusingly similar
surname or descriptive word or symbol with its product, its
purpose (as demonstrated through circumstantial evidence) was
merely to describe its own goods or services. The fair use de-
fense turns on the apparent reason for the defendant's affixa-
tion or other close association, not on the fact of the affixation
or other close association in itself. As the Supreme Court
made clear in KP Permanent Make-Up,215 even affixation of a
word or symbol that causes a likelihood of consumer confusion
may be deemed a lawful fair use.
There are numerous examples of cases in which the de-
fendant clearly made a "trademark use" of a descriptive word
or symbol from an objectively measured consumer perception
standpoint (that is, perceptively affixed or closely associated a
confusingly similar surname or descriptive word or symbol
with its product), but was nonetheless able to demonstrate that
the use was a good-faith "use otherwise than as a mark" for
purposes of the fair use defense. For example, in the Second
Circuit's famous decision, Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc., the plaintiff held incontestable trademark rights
in the word "Safari" as a mark for shoes. The defendant sold
suggestible" consumer perceptions can be, and how trademark doctrine and con-
sumer expectations "feed off each other, creating an endless loop" so that "what
consumers know (or think they know) about the law shapes expectations, which then
feed back into the law only to influence future expectations."); Austin, supra note
182, at 15-17 (discussing how marketing practices shape consumer expectations and
suggesting that the law might be shaped "proactively" to protect other legal princi-
ples, values and agendas).
Consumers may be led to expect (thorough mark owners' suggestion or public-
ity of prior infringement suits) that marks may only be reproduced by the mark
owner or under a license from the mark owner. To the extent that this happens, by
definition, consumers will believe that any unauthorized use of a mark they encoun-
ter signals some affiliation (at the least, a license relationship) between the user and
the owner. A strictly reactive consumer perception standard for judging trademark
use only strengthens this downwardly spiraling effect. This is undesirable, because it
enables mark owners to tighten their control over others' potentially expressive and
potentially pro-competitive uses of words and symbols, to the general detriment of
the public.
m 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
216 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
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the boots it imported from Africa under the designations
"Camel Safari," "Hippo Safari," and "Safari Chukka." While
the defendant clearly affixed or otherwise closely associated
"Safari" with its boots, and consumers certainly may have un-
derstood this use to indicate source, the Second Circuit found
it a non-infringing fair use. The Second Circuit reasoned that
the defendant was engaged in arranging safaris to Africa, had
published books about safaris, and purchased safari clothing in
Africa for resale in America. These facts sufficed to establish
that the defendant's application of "Safari" in connection with
the boots it sold was for descriptive purposes and not for pur-
poses of garnering the plaintiffs business good will. 217
Likewise, in Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.,2 the plaintiff had
incontestable rights in the word "Larvacide" for grain fumi-
gants. The defendant marketed its products as "Shell Poultry
Spray & Larvicide" (an insecticide to be sprayed on chickens to
control mites and lice, or on chicken droppings to inhibit the
growth of larvae and maggots) and "Rabon Oral Larvicide" (a
substance to be added to cattle feed to control fly larvae in
manure). Again, the defendant's use of "Larvicide" in its
products' commercial names easily satisfies the "affix or oth-
erwise closely associate" prerequisite, and might be understood
by consumers to indicate source. Nonetheless the Fifth Circuit
found that the defendant's use of "Larvicide" was for descrip-
219
tive purposes only, and a non-infringing fair use.
In International Stamp Art, Inc. v. United States Postal Ser-
vice, the plaintiff produced note cards, greeting cards, post-
ers, and prints featuring a perforated border design that
evoked the functional perforated edges of older postage
stamps. It registered the perforated border design as a mark
for printed note cards and greeting cards, and the registration
ultimately became incontestable. The defendant Postal Ser-
vice began offering a line of cards depicting postage stamps,
most of which included the perforated border of the original
stamp as part of the stamp's image. Again, the defendant
clearly "affixed" and "associated" the claimed trade dress per-
forations with its product, and consumers might perceive the
prominent appearance of a perforated border on the defen-
dant's greeting cards as indicating source. Nonetheless, the
Eleventh Circuit found that the defendant's actions consti-
" Id. at 12-13.
"' 617 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981).
"' Id. at 1186-89.
M 456 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2006).
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tuted a fair use, reasoning that the defendant's use was de-
scriptive, and a "use otherwise than as a mark" for purposes of
section 1115(b)(4).22 ' Indeed, in Cosmetically Sealed Industries,
Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's USA Co.,2" the Second Circuit found
that the defendant's use of the phrase "Sealed With A Kiss" in
promoting its lip gloss was a fair "use otherwise than as a mark"
for purposes of Lanham Act § 1115(b) (4), even though the
promotion closely associated the phrase with the defendant's
product, and specifically was found to lead consumers to asso-
ciate the phrase with the defendant's products.
One can find numerous additional examples of descrip-
tive or surname words or symbols affixed or closely associated
with a defendant's goods, which might be perceived by con-
sumers as source indicating, but which the court nonetheless
finds a good-faith use "otherwise than as a mark," or fair use.2
V. CONCLUSION
In developing the law of trademarks and unfair competi-
tion, courts sought to accommodate a range of potentially con-
flicting interests: to provide consumers with an efficient way to
identify product source and make informed purchasing deci-
sions; to ensure that competitors' marketing practices do not
improperly interfere with consumers' ability to rely on estab-
lished source-indicators for information about source; to po-
lice fraudulent marketing practices; to promote business in-
vestment in quality; to ensure that all businesses have the
22' Id. at 1274-77.
2 125 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1997).
"'Id. at 31.
2'' See, e.g., Leathersmith of London, Ltd. v. Alleyn, 675 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Plaintiff owns mark "Leathersmith" for leather goods, defendant applies the words
"Tantalus Custom Leathersmiths and Bookbinders" to its leather products. Seventh
Circuit finds that defendant's use is for descriptive purposes, and constitutes a fair
use); Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 1995)
(Plaintiff owns trademark rights in pine tree shape of its scented cardboard air fresh-
eners for cars, defendant markets plastic plug-in pine-scented air fresheners during
the Christmas season in the shape of a pine tree. Second Circuit finds that the de-
fendant's use of the pine shape is a descriptive, "non-trademark" use); Sunmark, Inc.
v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 64 F.3d 1055 (7th Cir. 1995) (Plaintiff owns rights
in "Sweetarts" as a mark for candy, defendant makes "sweet-tart" the centerpiece of
its advertising for cranberry juice. Seventh Circuit finds defendant's use to be a "non-
trademark," fair use); Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline Cochran, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) (Plaintiff owns rights in "Joy" as a mark for perfumes and toilet wa-
ters, defendant affixes the words "Joy of Bathing" prominently on both sides of its
packaging. Court finds that the use is primarily descriptive and a "non-trademark,"
fair use); Patterson v. TNA Entm't, 2006 W.L. 3091136 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 27, 2006)
(Plaintiff owns rights in "Superstars of Wrestling" and defendant competitor adver-
tises its wrestling broadcasts with the words "Superstars of TNA Wrestling" and "Su-
perstars of Wrestling." Court finds a "non-trademark," fair use).
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means to inform consumers about the qualities and character-
istics of their products, and to communicate this information
in an efficient manner; to ensure that the law itself does not
enable businesses to harass their competitors and chill robust
competition through threats of expensive, protracted litiga-
tion, when the risk of genuine injury to consumer reliance in-
terests is minor or nonexistent.
The common law of technical trademark infringement
limited an infringement defendant's liability to situations in
which it affixed an allegedly infringing word or symbol to its
own products, or otherwise closely associated the word or sym-
bol with those products in the course of marketing them.
Statutory language, legislative history, and case law all clearly
indicate that Congress codified this common-law limitation,
and applied it to all marks, when it enacted the Lanham Act in
1946. At a minimum, this "trademark use" limitation requires
that the defendant's use closely and directly associate the con-
tested word or symbol with its product or services, that con-
sumers be able to perceive the application, and that the appli-
cation be such as to make a commercial impression on
consumers, separate from other marketing material. If these
minimum requirements are met, then it is reasonably likely
that consumers may look to the defendant's word or symbol
for information about product source, and may possibly be
misled. In such a case, the interest in avoiding consumer con-
fusion is sufficiently implicated to proceed with litigation. If
those threshold requirements are not met, it is unlikely that
consumers will rely on the word or symbol for information
about source, and interests in preventing consumer confusion
are eclipsed by the countervailing interests in robust competi-
tion, expressive interests, and judicial efficiency.
The "trademark use" requirement permits courts to
evaluate likely consumer perceptions by focusing on indicative
factors that are relatively straightforward and objective. It thus
enables courts efficiently to identify and weed out bad claims
(claims whose anti-competitive effects are likely to outweigh
any threat to consumer reliance interests) early in the litiga-
tion process. However, it only provides a rough, first cut at
identifying and weeding out bad infringement claims. Many
suits to prevent socially beneficial uses of marks may proceed
through litigation, including claims to prevent uses of words in
their purely descriptive or surname capacity and claims to pre-
vent purely "nominative" uses of the plaintiffs mark to identify
the plaintiffs product in comparative advertising.
The law of unfair competition recognized that consum-
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ers might rely on descriptive, geographically descriptive, or
surname words and symbols to indicate product source under
some circumstances. But it simultaneously recognized that all
businesses legitimately need to use such words and symbols in
marketing their own products-indeed, marketplace competi-
tion requires that they be able to do so. Accordingly, the law
struck a balance between these competing trademark and
competition interests that afforded limited rights to businesses
that could demonstrate secondary (trademark) meaning in de-
scriptive or surname words or symbols: The law enabled them
to prohibit a defendant's use that caused a likelihood of con-
sumer confusion, but only if the defendant used the word or
symbol for a secondary (trademark) meaning, rather than for
its original descriptive or surname (non-trademark) meaning.
Congress clearly codified this limitation as the fair use defense,
in Lanham Act § 1115(b) (4). Thus, pursuant to the fair use
doctrine, even when a trademark claimant can demonstrate
that the defendant affixed or closely associated a confusingly
similar word or symbol to its product and can demonstrate
that this "trademark use" caused a likelihood of consumer con-
fusion about the product's source, the defendant can avoid li-
ability by demonstrating that its use was merely to describe its
product or its geographic origin or to identify itself as the
product's producer.
Both logic and the historical development of the "use
for secondary meaning" limitation indicate that the status of a
defendant's use as descriptive (non-trademark) or source-
indicating (trademark) should turn on the defendant's pur-
pose, as evidenced by a range of circumstantial evidence.
Looking to consumer perceptions to categorize the defen-
dant's use for purposes of the fair use defense would replicate
the issue of "trademark use" previously addressed in the plain-
tiff's case in chief,225 and make it virtually impossible to find
fair use when the use has caused a likelihood of consumer
confusion. Such a result would be contrary to Congress' clear
intention, and to the Supreme Court's holding, in KP Perma-
nent Make-Up, that fair use can be found even in the presence
of consumer confusion. Clearly some other means of evaluat-
ing fair use is indicated. The historical evolution of the fair
use defense provides that standard. The long-established prac-
It would not entirely replicate the "trademark use" evaluation, since the court
might make a more fact-intensive inquiry in the fair use phase of the litigation, be-
yond consideration of the objective factors implicit in the "affixation or other close
association" concept.
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tice of intertwining the "use for secondary meaning" require-
ment with the issue of fraudulent intent directs us to the de-
fendant's purpose in applying the allegedly infringing word or
symbol. Looking to the defendant's purpose promotes the in-
terest in preventing fraudulent marketing practices while si-
multaneously giving businesses the leeway they need to com-
municate the qualities and characteristics of their products to
consumers, minimizing the chilling effect of infringement
claims.
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